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THE BURDENS OF BENEFITS*
EDWARD J. MCCAFFERY**
I. INTRODUCTION
F AIRY tales typically have happy endings, and these typically involve the
creation or recreation of a stable, patriarchal nuclear family. The
Prince rescues the Damsel in Distress, the two get married, and everyone
lives happily ever after-the no-longer distressed damsel to stay home and
bear children, the Prince to ascend to the throne and perform his regal
duties. Along the way bad things have happened, of course; these typically
have to do with some disturbance of the happy home-the death of a
mother, for example, and the attendant introduction of an evil step-
mother.1 In the warm glow of the final scene, it is easy enough to forget
these ominous underpinnings. But in the dawn of a new day, members of
the target audience-our children-are left with a haunting fear of the
nontraditional family.
Many of us find ourselves living today not in the bright light of the
core case of an Ozzie-and-Harriet style family but somewhere in its
shadows. One-half of all American marriages now end in divorce; 2 one-
fourth of all American children live in single-parent households, most of
them poor;3 over two-thirds of two-parent households with young children
*This paper was prepared for the Thirty-Third Annual VILLANOVA LAw
REVIEW Symposium honoring Mary Joe Frug, entitled Still Hostile After All These
Years? Gender, Work & Family Revisited. I thank the conference organizers and
participants for helpful comments and Negin Mirmirani for excellent research
assistance.
** Maurice Jones Jr. Professor of Law, University of Southern California Law
School and Visiting Professor of Law and Economics, Division of Humanities and
Social Sciences, California Institute of Technology.
1. See MARINA WARNER, FROM THE BEAST TO THE BLONDE: ON FAIRY TALES AND
THEIR TELLERS 202, 218 (Farrar Straus & Giroux eds., 1995) (discussing absent
mothers, wicked stepmothers and their relationship to men). See generally MARTHA
ALBERTSON FINEMAN, THE NEUTERED MOTHER, SEXUAL FAMILY AND OTHER TWENTI-
ETH CENTURY TRAGEDIES (1995) (illustrating various disturbances that affect
families).
2. See U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES,
THE NATIONAL DATA BOOK tbl.145 (117th ed. 1997) [hereinafter STATISTICAL
ABSTRACT].
3. See STATISTICAL ABSTRACT, supra note 2, tbl.82, at 67 (noting number of
American children that live in single-parent households); Nancy E. Dowd, Stigma-
tizing Single Parents, 18 HARv. WOMEN'S L.J. 19, 21-22 (1995) ("Single-parent fami-
lies now constitute twenty-six percent of all families with minor children and are
the most rapidly growing family form in America.").
(445)
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include working mothers; 4 same-sex couples with children are increasingly
common.5 Yet our benefits programs-in many ways the crowning glory
of our "better angels," to use Lincoln's marvelous phrase 6-are still
pitched at paradigms. Social security, welfare, workfare and other govern-
ment assistance programs have dark sides-burdens-that either fall on
nontraditional households or stigmatize and perpetuate them, in poverty
and on the fringes.
It seems to be a fashion of the political left to criticize the status quo
and its reigning powers-to see the State as a bastion of prejudice, patri-
archy and greed and to damn all of its projects in one fell swoop. But
there is much that is commendable in modern democratic states such as
America, and much that is lost-including the possibilities of better ex-
change and collaboration among all who aspire to make our social world
better and fairer-when its critics neglect to give credit for this. Although,
for example, our welfare programs are not as generous as they could be,
they still exist, reflecting some degree of care and concern for our least
fortunate sisters and brothers. We should build them up-not tear them
down.
Nonetheless, like fairy tales, the good news of modern benefits pro-
grams often comes packaged with a dark side. Like fairy tales, both the
good and the bad more often than not has to do with images of the family.
Benefits programs are designed with the core case somewhere in mind-
to enhance and entrench, to aid in the restoration of, or to provide a
plausible replacement to, the preferred model of the patriarchal family.
This lea:es the benefits programs creating burdens on non-preferred,
nontraditional families. More often than not, these darker sides are unin-
tentional-or their status as "intentional" or not is complex, contested
and, ultimately, unimportant.7 What matters is that the burdens exist.
4. See EDWARD J. MCCAFFERY, TAXING WOMEN 12 (1997); see also STATISTICAL
ABSTRACT, supra note 2, tbl.631 (noting number of working mothers in two-parent
households).
5. See generally Patricia A. Cain, Same Sex Couples and the Federal Tax Law, 1 LAW
& SEXUALIrY 97 (1991).
6. See Abraham Lincoln, First Inaugural Address (Mar. 4, 1861), in ABRAHAM
LINCOLN: SPEECHES AND WRITINGS, 1859-1865 215, 224 (Library of Am. ed., 1989).
7. See Lawrence Zelenak, Tax and the Married Woman, 70 S. CAL. L. REv. 1021,
1021-48 (1997) (discussing burdens on nontraditional families). Zelenak's inform-
ative review of my book, TAXING WOMEN, supra note 4, accuses me of overstating
the extent to which Congress intended the pattern of gender bias in the tax laws.
Although I think that there is indeed good reason to believe that the bias was
intended-putting aside the usual problems with assigning "intent" to a group-
my main response to this charge is that it does not matter much. Either Congress
intended to generate a pattern of disincentives for working wives and two-earner
families, or they failed to notice and respond as the burdens grew in intensity.
Either way, the burdens exist, and society bears responsibility for them.
[Vol. 44: p. 445
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A. Two Models
There is a familiar dynamic. When a benefits program is first put in
place, it is motivated or at least informed by a paradigm of the ideal, Oz-
zie-and-Harriet style family, which has a father who works outside the
home and a mother who works inside it.8 There are two broad archetypes.
In the first of these, what I shall call the Core Model, the benefits
program is set up directly to assist the patriarchal core case. Its benefi-
ciaries are one-earner, two-parent families, and its burdens fall on all else,
especially working mothers. The State makes sure that the non-working
woman/mother is protected. In doing so, it penalizes any attempt she
might make to work outside the home. In the beginning, this is all done
in explicitly gendered language; the benefits go to stay-at-home mothers,
not fathers, and widows, not widowers, are protected.9 Eventually, the ex-
plicit gendered dimension is replaced with a "gender neutral" structural
bias-one-earner families are benefitted and two-earner families are bur-
dened. Ironically, this facial gender neutrality is subsequently used to de-
fend the status quo. But the brute reality is that one-earner, two-parent
families overwhelmingly feature working fathers and stay-at-home
mothers; there are few full-time, non-working, stay-at-home married fa-
thers in America. 10 The paradigm thus remains patriarchal in fact if no
longer in name. At least as important, a bias towards one-earner families is
still a bias, after all, and one that has deepened over time even as two-
earner families have become the statistical norm. The persistence of the
core paradigm is not only gendered in its roots; it is also set against flexi-
bility and freedom for modern families of all non-core sorts.
We can understand the benefits in the Core Model as helping Ozzie
to be Ozzie-as privileging, entrenching and perpetuating the patriarchal
model, the "happily ever after" image of the fairy tale.
In the second set of cases, what I shall call the Displaced Model, it is
the failure of a patriarchal household to form or to persist that generates
the perceived need for a benefits program. The animating conception is
8. Women have always worked, of course. See generally ALICE KESSLER-HARRIS,
WOMEN HAVE ALWAYS WORKED: AN HISTORICAL OVERVIEW (1981) (reminding us
that women-including stay-at-home mothers-have always worked); see also Nancy
C. Staudt, Taxing Housework, 84 GEO. L.J. 1571, 1619-20 (1996) (discussing possibil-
ity of empowering women by taxing women's household labor). The stereotypical
family that I am after has a father who engages in paid market work outside the
home and a woman who stays home and engages in unpaid housework.
9. See Mary E. Becker, Obscuring the Struggle: Sex Discrimination, Social Security,
and Stone, Seidman, Sunstein & Tushnet's Constitutional Law, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 264,
272 (1989) (discussing scenario in which widowers are "entitled to survivors' retire-
ment benefit only if they showed dependency on their deceased wives, whereas
widows were automatically entitled to survivors' benefits"). Further, "most widow-
ers are not eligible for spouses' benefits, regardless of whether they can show de-
pendency, because one can claim as a spouse of a deceased covered worker only if
one's owns benefits as a covered worker are less than the deceased spouse's bene-
fits." Id. at 273.
10. See STATISTICAL ABSTRACT, supra note 2, tbls.629, 632.
1999]
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that the absence of a traditional one-earner, two-parent household both
constitutes the major problem and justifies some State largesse. We help
Cinderella in her period of living outside the privileged core case. The
State steps in and plays the role of the absent father/provider, disbursing
benefits. The recurrent image is of a poor abandoned mother who needs
some social support. Once again, the initial programs are explicitly
gendered. The social beneficence is limited to lower-income custodial
mothers and looks to a restoration of the "normal" state'of the core case-
it typically ceases on marriage. Over time, things change in the Displaced
Model-both the benefits programs and the very conception of the prob-
lem-as we shall see below.
We can understand the benefits in the Displaced Model as filling in
for Ozzie.
B. Two Paths
The two models play themselves out in starkly different.ways despite
the common beginning. In all cases, the benefits program starts small.
Promulgators of the benefits do not notice the inevitable flip-side, the bur-
dens, which are in any event minor in their incidence, or somehow do not
count them as "bad" if they do notice. Because the program is so closely
tied to deep social stereotypes and expectations of family life, it is not per-
ceived as "social engineering." Over time the benefits program grows. At
this point, the two Models split off in very different directions.
In the Core Model, the benefits program comes to generate a sense of
entitlement. Reform efforts concentrate on protecting the core benefi-
ciaries who assume that continued protection is a given. The benefits lose
their identification as "benefits" and become instead part of a new status
quo or baseline. 1 The burdens on nontraditional families and individuals
outside the core case continue to be little noticed. These burdens never
form a central focus of reform efforts although the expansion of the pro-
gram has made them more severe. Society continues not to perceive any
"social engineering" because it attributes the program's design to neutral
rules and policies. The pattern is one of Humble Beginnings/Growth/
Entrenchment.
In the Displaced Model, the program also grows over time. As it does
so, its burdens also become more constricting. The failure to extend the
reach of the program to a wider range of settings becomes more noticea-
ble. The various "traps" laid by the rigidity of the system-for example,
poverty traps, anti-marriage traps-become more problematic. Rather
than leading to any sense of entitlement, however, the growth of the bene-
fits program in the Displaced Model only leads members of the privileged
core to complain more vehemently about the burdens imposed on them
11. See Duncan Kennedy & Frank L. Michelman, Are Property and Contract Effi-
cient?, 8 HOFSTRA L. REv. 711, 711-20 (1980) (discussing determination of
'baselines').
[Vol. 44: p. 445
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and to begin to doubt the necessity or wisdom of continuing to benefit
non-core cases at all. The benefits never get accepted into a reconstituted
status quo; they continue to be seen as optional acts of largesse. Reform
efforts concentrate on dismantlement and retrenchment. The fact that
the paradigm in the Displaced Model is of a nontraditional family comes
back to haunt it. Why should the "we" of the Core Model be protecting a
"them" who exist in non-core cases? A moral language is invoked to blame
the beneficiaries for their very non-core status. Why aren't "they" mar-
ried? Why do "they" have children? Why can't "they" earn their own
keep? The benefits themselves become yet another burden on the recipi-
ents leading to stigma, blame and, ultimately, abandonment or weakening
of the program.
Somewhere along the way an even more surprising turn takes place.
A dramatic reconception of the paradigmatic non-core family comes
about. In the beginning, the point of benefits in the Displaced Model was
to assimilate certain sympathetic non-core cases-Cinderella stories-into
the core by replacing Ozzie with the State. The custodial mother was seen
as caught between two worlds: the happy one of the core Ozzie-and-Har-
riet style family and the netherworld of non-core cases where wicked step-
mothers and other villains permanently dwell. The initial benefits
program attempted to rescue Cinderella from this state of limbo by bring-
ing her into the core with the State as the surrogate husband/father. But
as the program grows and becomes more expensive, the burdens it im-
poses on the core families who perceive themselves as being taxed to pro-
vide the benefits become more manifest. This motivates a reconception.
It becomes first accepted, then mandated, that the custodial single
parent in the Displaced Model engage in some productive work; welfare is
born again as workfare. This is not seen, as it was initially, as threatening
the core case, because the woman at the center of the Displaced Model
has come to be viewed as permanently outside the core, as a part of a
"they" that is not "us." The custodial mother is sometimes seen as herself
harmed by the benefits (trapped in a "cycle of dependence"), so that the
reconception is for her own good;1 2 at other times she is viewed as bad for
accepting the State as her groom (a "welfare queen"), and the reconcep-
tion is for the sake of the good itself.13 In either event, it is now seen as
fitting and proper for Cinderella to work, at least if the alternative is living
on the public dole. This reconception thus banishes Cinderella to a life
permanently outside the core. Mainstream society has given up on her.
12. See Lucy A. Williams, The Ideology of Division: Behavior Modification Welfare
Reform Proposals, 102 YALE L.J. 719, 719-20 (1992) (stating traditional view that re-
cipients are "dysfunctional mothers incapable of fitting into mainstream society,
and they are economically and emotionally atrophied because of their 'depen-
dence' on welfare").
13. See id. at 719 (stating traditional view that welfare recipients are responsi-
ble for their own poverty); see also Tonya L. Brito, From Madonna to Proletariat: Con-
structing a New Ideology of Motherhood in Welfare Discourse, 44 VILL. L. REv. 415, 419-20
(1999).
1999] 449
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Or, as one scholar has put it, the model continues to be one of encourag-
ing a woman's dependence-but only on men, not on the state writ
large. 1
4
The wider society sees the programs in the Displaced Model, in con-
trast to those in the Core Model, as acts of "social engineering." This be-
comes either a catch-phrase for arguing against the benefits programs at
their root and in toto, or else is a given, accepted fact of the matter-a
legitimate, even necessary, accompaniment to the State's largesse. Tech-
nocratic debates over just how to socially engineer come into play to redi-
rect the program. The metric for continuance of the benefits is their
consequences for the wider society and its core cases-whether or not the
beneficiaries in the Displaced Model come over time to be less dependent
on, or burdensome to, society; what "bang for the buck" "we" all get.
These kinds of questions are never asked in the Core Model, where the
benefits are taken as a matter of right that finesses the need for, or trumps
the impact of, any analysis of consequential effects. The pattern in the
Displaced Model is one of Humble Beginnings/Growth/Retrenchment.
C. One End
Not surprisingly, there is a strong political perceptual dimension to all
of these stories and their effects. Psychologists and other social theorists
have long known that there is a "status quo bias"-a tendency to be averse
to change, to view any disruption to the way things are with suspicion and
fear.1 5 The benefits stories show that there is also a strong political and
ideological dimension to what, exactly, is taken to form the status quo in
the first place-what we might call an "assimilative bias" in what we take to
be part of the way things are "meant to be." 16 In the Core Model, the
"benefits" early on lose their status as benefits in the popular psyche-they
become assimilated into the core. Their burdens are not noticed and
their perpetuation is taken for granted, as a precondition for any subse-
14. See Twila L. Perry, Family Values, Race, Feminism and Public Policy, 36 SANTA
CLARA L. REv. 345, 361 (1996) ("Because we live in a patriarchal society, it is con-
sidered acceptable for women to be economically dependent, as long as that de-
pendency is on a man.... On the other hand, many people would feel that the
mother on public assistance is lazy and should take any job.").
15. See generally Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, Prospect Theory: An Analy-
sis of Decision Under Risk, 47 ECONOMIcA 263 (1979). I discuss the status quo bias in
EdwardJ. McCaffery, Cognitive Theory and Tax, 41 UCLA L. REv. 1861 (1994) [here-
inafter McCaffery, Cognitive Theory] and in Edward J. McCaffery et al., Framing the
Jury: Cognitive Perspectives on Pain and Suffering Awards, 81 VA. L. Rev. 1341 (1995)
(noting that people acting under pervasive influence of status quo bias are averse
to change) [hereinafter McCaffery et al., Framing the Jury]. For a classical conserva-
tive's general arguments against revolution and change, see generally EDMUND
BURKE, REFLECTIONS ON THE REvOLUTION IN FRANCE, 1790 (Conor Cruise O'Brien
ed., 1987).
16. See generally Martha Alberston Fineman, The Inevitability of Dependency and
the Politics of Subsidy, 9 STAN. L. & POL'Y REv. 89 (1998) (arguing that all individuals
in our society receive some form of subsidy).
[Vol. 44: p. 445
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quent change or reform. In the Displaced Model, in contrast, the salience
of the "benefits" only grows over time as the benefits increase in magni-
tude. This growth serves to draw attention to the ways in which benefits to
some (non-core families) pose a burden on others (the core families).
Benefits to non-core members of society remain deviations, and the larger
they are, the more objectionable they become. Society is consistently se-
lective in what programs and policies are assimilated into the status quo.
The status quo and assimilative biases are followed by and related to
two other political perceptual biases. First, there is a "neutrality bias"-a
tendency to support policies, programs and procedures that can be de-
fended in "neutral" terms. 17 Butjust as with the status quo and assimila-
tive biases, there is a bias in what is taken as neutral in the first place.
Programs that benefit core cases seem neutral; those that benefit non-core
cases do not. Finally, and again relatedly, there is a "consequentialism"
bias.18 Programs within the core are not justified on consequential
grounds; we use instead the language of neutrality and fairness, rights and
entitlement. Programs outside the core, in contrast, are evaluated in
terms of the results they produce and are altered or abandoned if these
outcomes are not satisfactory to the core.
What is consistent in all of this is that benefits are taken for granted to
the core and left tenuous to the non-core and that burdens on the core
are noticed while burdens on the non-core are not. In all cases, the core
wins-in both ultimate outcome and in the psychological framing and un-
derstanding of the very issues at stake.
In what follows, I sketch out four examples to illustrate these points. I
hasten to add that many scholars operating in many disciplines-many of
them feminist-oriented ones-have done important work exploring in
great depth the programs I discuss, necessarily briefly, below. My aim is
not to add to this considerable body of work as it is to collect various
pieces of it together and summarize it in a way that emphasizes the central
connections across benefits programs.
The first two examples fall into the Core Model. The first is a classic
"benefits" program-social security. 19 The second is a structural aspect of
our tax system-the pattern of joint filing and marriage bonuses under
the income tax.20 The next two examples fall into the Displaced Model.
Once again the first, welfare, is a classic "benefits" program.2 1 The sec-
17. See Edward J. McCaffery, Taxation and the Family: A Fresh Look at Behavioral
Gender Biases in the Code, 40 UCLA L. REv. 983, 1035 (1993).
18. See generally Jonathan Baron & Ilana Ritov, Intuitions About Penalties and
Compensation in the Context of Tort Law, 7 J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY 17 (1993).
19. For a discussion of social security, see infra notes 23-61 and accompanying
text.
20. For a discussion of marriage bonuses, see infra notes 62-123 and accompa-
nying text.
21. For a discussion of welfare, see infra notes 124-65 and accompanying text.
1999]
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ond, the earned-income tax credit, is a structural feature of our tax laws.22
Aside from illustrating the ideas sketched out above, these examples also
illustrate that the line between "benefits" and "burdens" is very thin in-
deed and that our social, economic and legal institutions contain many
examples of each.
II. THE CORE MODEL: HELPING OZZIE BE OZZIE
A. Social Security
1. Humble Beginnings
The great Social Security Act of 1935,23 embracing both the social
security and the welfare systems as we have come to know them, sprung to
life in the midst of the Great Depression and Franklin Roosevelt's first
term as president. 24 The old age assistance and retirement program that
is my subject in this section was originally intended to be an actuarially-
funded system. In other words, the taxes or "contributions" collected
from workers were to be set aside and invested so that these precise funds
could later be drawn down by the same pool of workers that contributed
them. 25 Rates were low-a 1% "contribution" from each worker matched
by an equal share from the employer. 26
By 1937, the advent of Keynesian economics had changed the govern-
ment's thinking.27 Building up a large reserve during a time of general
under-consumption was no longer seen as a good idea. The Roosevelt
Administration decided to switch over to a "pay as you go" model, in which
current workers would make contributions into a system that would then
immediately be paid out to current beneficiaries. This meant in practical
22. For a discussion of the earned-income tax credit, see infta notes 166-212
and accompanying text.
23. Social Security Act, ch. 531, §§ 1-2110, 49 Stat. 620 (1935) (current ver-
sion at 42 U.S.C. §§ 301-1397jj (1998)).
24. See generally MCCAFFERY, supra note 4, at 98-101 (discussing social security
and welfare systems during Great Depression).
25. See Connie Chang, Immigrants under the New Welfare Law: A Call for Uniform-
ity, A Call for Justice, 45 UCLA L. REv. 205, 280 (1997) ("The steady, reliable, con-
tributing workers were included in the retirement program, and the marginal
workers, domestics and agricultural laborers were relegated to state old-age assist-
ance and local relief.").
26. See Patricia E. Dilley, The Evolution of Entitlement: Retirement Income and the
Problem of Integrating Private Pensions and Social Security, 30 Loy. L.A. L. REv. 1063,
1123 (1997) (noting that stated purpose of both 1935 Act and 1939 Act was
"preventing dependency in old-age"). The goal of the contributory social security
program was to "enable younger workers, with matching contributions from their
employers, to build up a more adequate old-age protection than it is possible to
achieve with noncontributory pensions based on a means test." Id. at 1123-24.
27. See Nancy C. Staudt, Constitutional Politics and Balanced Budgets, 1998 U.
ILL. L. REv. 1105, 1148 (1998) (recognizing how Keynesian Economics led to
growth in size of government and "lent intellectual support for augmented govern-
ment intervention into domestic affairs"). See generally JOHN MAYNARD KEYNES, THE
GENERAL THEORY OF EMPLOYMENT, INTEREST, AND MONEY (1936).
[Vol. 44: p. 445
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terms that the reserve would be spent now, providing a beneficial stimulus
to the economy. 28 It also meant that, by deviating from actuarial princi-
ples, there would be windfall "winners" from the government's action. In
other words, a benefits program was being born. Roosevelt appointed a
commission to decide exactly how to spend the surplus, and this led to
eventual changes in the statute in 1939.29
Alice Kessler-Harris has done wonderful archival research to give us a
glimpse into the thinking of the Social Security Advisory Council. 30 This
distinguished panel, consisting mainly of men drawn from politics,
academia and business, considered two main proposals. The first looked
to extend benefits to agricultural workers, which included largely African-
Americans. 3 1 This was opposed by Southern Democrats, and the plan
went nowhere. 3 2 Instead, the panel chose another benefits program-the
extension of social security benefits to women as wives of retirees or as
widows.33 After much discussion, the Council agreed to give a retired man
with a wife present in the household 150% of the benefits that he would
get as a single man.3 4 On his death, his widow would get a "widow's share"
of 75% of his benefits-one-half of the communal whole. 35
The initial law was explicitly sexist in that it referred to widows and
wives-a feature subsequently dropped by a court ruling that ironically
favored men. 36 What the 1939 change did in essence was to provide a
retirement and death protection benefit for every wife of a working man.
It was as if the government had bought an annuity and life insurance pol-
28. See Lucy A. Williams & Margaret Y.K. Woo, The "Worthy" Unemployed: Socie-
tal Stratification and Unemployment Insurance Programs in China and the United States,
33 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 457, 478-79 (1995) (explaining that President
Roosevelt established Committee on Economic Security in 1934 with mandate to
"'stimulat[e] ... private employment and provid[e] ... public employment for
those able-bodied workers whom industry cannot employ at a given time"') (cita-
tions omitted).
29. See id. at 478-81 (outlining formation of Committee on Economic Secur-
ity, as well as its goals and actions).
30. Alice Kessler-Harris, Designing Women and Old Fools: The Construction of the
Social Security Amendments of 1939, in U.S. HISTORY AS WOMEN'S HISTORY: NEW FEMI-
NIST ESSAYS 87 (Linda K. Kerber et al. eds., 1995) (discussing rationale behind
recommendations of Social Security Advisory Council).
31. See id. at 103 (outlining historical debate surrounding Committee's initial
proposal to cover African Americans).
32. See id. ("Discussion of the issue continued when the Advisory Council's
recommendation went to Congress, but the resistance of southern congressman
prevailed.").
33. See id. at 91-92 (stating that Congress "added dependent wives and aged
widows to shore up the legitimacy of a system in trouble").
34. See id. at 98.
35. Id.
36. See Becker, supra note 9, at 272-76 (discussing case of Califano v. Goldfarb,
430 U.S. 199 (1977), where plaintiffs challenged provisions under which widowers
were entitled to survivors' retirement benefits only if they showed dependency on
their deceased wives, whereas widows were automatically entitled to survivors'
benefits).
1999]
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icy on every married man in America. This is, of course, what a good
Ozzie or male provider ought to have done anyway: as one federal judge
put it in 1950, it was a "highly natural and indeed burning desire of most
men of middle age to obtain security for their old age and for their widows
at death."3 7 The law was simply making sure that Ozzie played out his
role.
What was barely noticed was the burden that the benefits decision
imposed. This fell not just on unmarried men, who failed to get the ex-
panded benefit given to married men, but, worse, on working married
women. The law provided that a woman would get the greater of her own
benefit, which was based on a weighted index of her earnings profile over
a thirty-eight year history, or her spousal share. 38 For the overwhelming
majority of married women who engaged in some paid work, this meant
claiming the latter.3 9 But this meant, in turn, getting no benefit from her
own social security "contributions." When this effect was seen by the Advi-
sory Council, it was considered to be a positive aspect of the overall benefit
plan.40 The implicit penalty on working married women would "take away
the urge to go back and compete with the single woman," as a leading
member of the Council put it.4 1 Note the double sexism of this attitude.
First, married women should not work in the first place. Second, if they
did, they were assumed to be competing with single women for the scant
jobs in the "woman's sphere" of the economy. Harriet should stay home,
for women's sakes.
2. Growth
Three sets of facts propelled the social security story just sketched out
from its humble beginnings. First, the overall system grew enormously. In
part because social security was a better disguised tax system, it has grown
far more since World War II than has the income tax.4 2 Starting around
1950, rates under the combined social security/medicare system were
raised at the fairly steady rate of 3% per decade until they reached their
current level of 15.3% in the 1980s-a 750% increase over their initial 2%
37. United States v. Drescher, 179 F.2d 863, 867 (2d Cir. 1950) (Clark, J.,
dissenting in part).
38. See Kessler-Harris, supra note 30, at 100 (describing generally woman's
choice of benefits between own earnings and husband's).
39. See id. ("The Advisory Council fully expected that married women would
work occasionally and that their contributions... [would] help sustain its financial
health without yielding any direct benefit to the female contributor.").
40. See id. at 101 ("The effect of this policy on women was unclear, but the
hopeful anticipation of the architects was not: it might ... have the advantage of
discouraging wives from returning to industry.").
41. Id.
42. See Edward J. McCaffery, Cognitive Theory, supra note 15, at 1877 ("This
social perception [of contribution versus tax] seems to be breaking down a bit, as
the social security system has grown in size to account for 85% as much annual
revenue intake as income tax .... ").
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level. 43 Today, social security accounts for almost 90% of the dollars that
the personal income tax system collects;4 4 most Americans, with the
proper understanding of economic incidence, pay more in these so-called
payroll "contributions" than they do in income taxes.45 Social security and
medicare combined act like a flat 15.3% tax on the first $70,000 or so of a
person's earnings-there are no personal exemptions, "zero brackets," ac-
commodations for family size or the like. 46 Figure 1 shows the growth of
social security contributions as a percentage of total federal revenues,
compared to the relative stagnation of the income tax in the same percent-
age terms, during the post-War era.
47
Legend
0] Income Tax
E Social Security
1950 1955 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995
FIGURE 1: SoctAL SECURITY AND THE INCOME TAx, 1950-1995
Second, at the same time that the overall social security system was
growing, the widow's benefit also expanded. It grew from its initial 75%,
43. See generally COMMERCE CLEARING HOUSE, 1998 U.S. MASTER TAX GUIDE 49
(1998) (stating that current earner will pay full 15.3% social security contribution
on approximately first $70,000).
44. See McCaffery, Cognitive Theory, supra note 15, at 1877 n.33 (noting that
although income tax has progressive structure designed to "raise revenue from
higher income taxpayers, most tax payers will pay more under the social security
tax").
45. See U.S. MASTER TAx GUIDE, supra note 43, at 49 (noting that there are no
personal exemptions or accommodations under Internal Revenue Code for social
security contributions).
46. McCaffery, Cognitive Theory, supra note 15, at 1881 (discussing effect of
social security and medicare on personal earnings).
47. See McCAFFERY, supra note 4, at 97 (providing statistics to prove how "so-
cial security laws rather dramatically favor only single-earner families that stay to-
gether, until death do them part").
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first to 82.5% in 1961, then to 100% in 1972.48 Today a married woman,
at her husband's retirement, gets the larger of her own social security
share or one-half of his share and again, on his death, the larger of her
own or 100% of her husband's share. 49 This is no small matter. Social
security is a major source of income for elderly Americans. 50 The benefits
structure first set in 1939 has led to a bizarre phenomenon of "marriage
penalties" among the elderly, with various seniors living "in sin" rather
than forfeiting their large social security contributions. This situation ex-
ists because a widow receiving a 100% share of her late husband's social
security benefits would drop down to receiving a 50% share of her new
husband's on remarriage-a fact that many seniors know quite well. 51
Third, of course, the incidence of married working women expanded
greatly. Whereas fewer than 10% of married women with young children
worked outside the home in 1940, at the outset of World War I-and at
the time that the spousal and widow's shares provisions were being cre-
ated-nearly 70% of such women now do, as Figure 2 shows. 52 But the
social security law has not changed one wit to accommodate these working
married women.
48. See Lawrence Zelenak, Taking Critical Tax Theory Seriously, 76 N.C. L. REv.
1521, 1532 (1998) (explaining how "a married woman who has paid no Social
Security tax of her own is entitled to old-age benefits equal to 50% of her hus-
band's [primary insurance] benefits .... If her husband has died, she is entitled
to monthly old-age benefits equal to 100% of his [benefits] ....").
49. See Dilley, supra note 26, at 1086 (describing historical development of
social security as that of "[a] major federal entitlement program"); see also NancyJ.
Altman, The Reconciliation of Retirement Security and Tax Policies: A Response to Profes-
sor Graetz, 136 U. PA. L. REv. 1419, 1420 (1988) (stating that "old-age and survivors
portion of Social Security is [America's] primary public retirement program out of
variety of public, private, and publicly-encouraged private sources of retirement
income").
50. See Karen C. Burke & Grayson M.P. McCouch, Women, Fairness and Social
Security, 82 IoWA L. REV. 1209, 1219 (1997) (discussing Professor McCaffery's the-
ory that current system undermines incentive for wife to enter work force, rein-
forces traditional notion of family, and bias, and goes against "optimal tax"
principles); see alsoJohn B. Forman, What Can Be Done About Marriage Penalties, 30
FAM. L.Q. 1, 6-19 (1996) (discussing problem of "marriage penalties" associated
with Social Security system) [hereinafter Forman, Marriage Penalties]; John B. For-
man, Promoting Fairness in the Social Security Retirement Program: Partial Integration
and a Credit for Dual-Earner Couples, 45 TAx LAw. 915, 933-34 (1992) (same) [herein-
after Forman, Promoting Fairness].
51. See Zelenak, supra note 48, at 1532 (discussing "marriage penalty" for
elderly).
52. See McCAFFERY, supra note 4, at 21; see also STATISTIcAL ABsTRACT, supra
note 2.
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FIGURE 2: PARTICIPATION RATES FOR MARRIED MOTHERS, 1940-1995
These three growth factors work together to make the social security
system a very large example of the Core Model, helping Ozzie be Ozzie.
One-earner families are the big winners; two-worker families and, in partic-
ular, working mothers, are the big losers. Consider a basic example: a wife
whose husband makes $30,000 might accept a part-time job paying
$10,000. Because of her work, $1,530 will be contributed to the social
security system-$765 out of her pocket and another $765 out of her em-
ployer's.53 '(This latter is money that she was "worth," in an economic
sense; it was money that her employer could have paid out in child-care
benefits, for example, instead of to her distant Uncle Sam.) How much
will the wife benefit from this'$1,530 contribution? The shocking answer
is not one penny. Because she will claim under the spousal share, her own
contributions bring no additional benefits.
Social security is a complicated system and its precise payouts are indi-
vidualized. But the two-earner penalty is pervasive. Indeed, it is always
present in a two-worker household, because even if the wife earns nearly as
much or more than her husband, and works just as long outside the
home-such that she will claim under her own share-it is still the case
that she has received no marginal payback for her first dollars of social
security contributions. This is money that only replaced her deemed
share of her husband's wages. One pair of economists has shown that a
53. See I.R.C. § 3101 (a)-(b) (1994) (requiring 6.2% tax on wages for "old-age,
survivors, and disability insurance" and 1.45% tax on wages for "hospital insur-
ance," totaling 7.65% tax on wages from each employer and employee); McCAF-
FERY, supra note 4, at 91 (noting that "social security operates like flat-rate wage
tax" with percentage rate of 15.3 currently in effect).
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family's social security contributions might increase by nearly 50% on the
wife's working, while their benefits will go up by a mere 1%.5 4 Another
pair has shown that social security is a poor investment for two-worker
households and a reasonably good one for one-earner ones.55 This is no
surprise. It was the point of the 1939 changes.
3. Entrenchment
The social security saga perfectly illustrates the general themes dis-
cussed in Part I. It is particularly interesting in the way that it has tracked
the welfare story to be discussed in Part III throughout its history. Social
security and Aid to Dependent Children (ADC), discussed below, each be-
gan as part of the Social Security Act of 1935.56 As with welfare, discourse
about reforming social security is now in the political air, six decades
later. 57 But the urging for reform is where the similarities end. The focus
of reform efforts in social security is not on lessening its burdens; it is most
certainly not on the secondary-earner bias, which has been noticed only by
a handful of academics and technocratic commissions. Social security re-
54. See EUGENE C. STEUERLE &JON M. BAKIJA, RETOOLING SOCIAL SECURITY FOR
THE 21ST CENTURY-. RIGHT AND WRONG APPROACHES TO REFORM 210-11 (1994) (il-
lustrating very low returns working wives receive on social security taxes they pay).
According to Steuerle and Bakija:
[In] a family where the husband earns at least the maximum wage subject
to Social Security tax in every year.... [and] the wife earned the average
national wage every year for 46 years, the family's lifetime Social Security
contributions would increase by about 43 percent. The value of the fam-
ily's [Old-Age and Survivors Insurance] benefit, however, would only in-
crease by 1 percent compared to what would be received if she never
worked at all. Almost exactly the same story holds true in a family where
the husband earns the average national wage and the wife earns low
wages.
Id.; see MCCAFFERY, supra note 4, at 97-98 (providing statistics, adapted from
Steuerle and Bakija's book, that show how "[f]amilies can easily see their contribu-
tions go up by one-half or even double, all for a negligible increase in their
benefits").
55. See MICHAEL J. BOSKIN & DOUGLAS J. PUFFERT, SOCIAL SECURITY AND THE
AMERICAN FAMILY 7-11, 25 tbl.1 (National Bureau of Econ. Research Working Paper
No. 2117 (1987)) (revealing how "moving from single-earner households to an
identical earnings stream split between the couple reduces the expected present
value of benefits and the expected present value of transfers"). In their study of
single-earner versus two-earner couples, Boskin and Puffert conclude that "[u] ntil
the married woman's own earnings history (if any) is sufficient to produce benefits
beyond the spouse's benefit, the entire Social Security payroll tax is a pure tax,
with no corresponding presumption of future incremental Social Security bene-
fits." Id. at 9.
56. For a discussion of the Social Security Act of 1935, see supra notes 24-27
and accompanying text. For a discussion of the Aid to Dependent Children
(ADC) program and its successors, Aid to Families with Dependent Children
(AFDC) and Temporary Aid to Needy Families (TANF), see infra notes 124-65 and
accompanying text.
57. See President William Jefferson Clinton, State of the Union as Prepared
for Delivery (Jan. 19, 1999), 1999 WL 18084, at *2 (proclaiming that "first and
above all, we must save Social Security for the 21st Century").
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form focuses instead on assuring the actuarial soundness of the system,
indexing its benefits or privatizing the program-all steps to ensure that
the benefits go on, unchecked. 58
Indeed, there is not a general awareness of the fact that there even is
a benefits dimension to social security. The system is thought of and de-
scribed in the language of entitlement.59 This might be harmless insofar
as the imputation of one's own earnings to himself or herself goes. But it
is far more dubious in the case of the spousal and widow's share provi-
sions. Here a man is entitled to an added bonus on account of having a
non-working spouse; the same man, if unmarried or if married to a work-
ing spouse, would not so benefit. To be perfectly clear, this benefit may
itself be good because it is a way of protecting and rewarding homemak-
ers.60 But what is problematic-and what is not generally noticed-is the
gratuitous burden that such a benefits program has put on modern, two-
worker families. In such households, the "second" worker pays a pure tax,
with no return, as we have seen. If society noticed that burden more, it
could address it without necessarily cutting back on the stay-at-home
spouses' benefits. We could, for example, provide for a secondary-earner
exemption under social security, exempting the first $10,000 of the sec-
ond worker's earnings from the payroll tax. But to do that, we would have
to notice the burden in the first place. We do not notice these burdens,
however, because we do not even recognize the benefits dimension built
into the system. This all strikes us as neutral-a part of the way things are.
In any event, it is part of the way we assume that things must be.
There are many other problems in the social security system. For ex-
ample, the rules for divorced spouses or the failure to extend any of the
benefits to same-sex couples also reflect the power of the patriarchal para-
digm.61 But the basic story sketched out above suffices for present pur-
58. See id. (acknowledging that senior women are almost twice as likely as eld-
erly men to be poor, but not proposing any structural reforms to Social Security).
Instead, President Clinton focused on the fiscal soundness of the program by pro-
posing "that we commit sixty percent of the budget surplus for the next 15 years to
Social Security, investing a small portion in the private sector just as any private or
state government pension would do." Id.; see McCAFFERY, supra note 4, at 101 (not-
ing that few changes have been made to structure of social security system, but
"[m]uch more attention has been paid to the fiscal solvency of the system, its
budgeting procedures, the contribution and payout levels, and so on").
59. See, e.g., MICHAEL B. KATZ, IN THE SHADOW OF THE POORHOUSE: A SOCIAL
HISTORY OF WELFARE IN AMERICA 268 (1986) (commenting that 1969-72 amend-
ments made social security "a 'retirement wage"' and referring to these benefits as
"entitlements").
60. See generally Staudt, supra note 8, at 1597 (discussing how payroll taxes
provide citizens with important benefits during periods of disability or retirement
and that "[blecause household labor is not taxed, women's access to these critical
resources is greatly restricted").
61. See Becker, supra note 9, at 282 (discussing problems that social security
structure poses for divorced women). Professor Becker explains that "[t]he treat-
ment of divorced wives is rather different from the treatment of wives and widows."
Id. A divorced wife is only entitled to benefits under her ex-husband's social secur-
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poses. Social security helps Ozzie be Ozzie, it pushes Harriet to stay
Harriet, and nobody seems to mind.
B. Marriage Bonuses
1. Humble Beginnings
The modern personal income tax dates back to 1913.62 Generally
speaking, the United States had a system of separate filing for the income
tax until 1948.63 Under separate filing, men and women file separate tax
returns whether married or not, paying taxes on earned income under
their own, individual rate schedules. 64 Because there is no distinction be-
tween individuals based on marital status, there is only one rate schedule
for natural persons.65 A separate filing system, as most developed Western
nations now have, is thus "marriage neutral"-marriage is more or less
irrelevant for tax purposes. 66
Separate filing posed a particular problem for the patriarchal core
case. A family with two earners would get "two rides up the rate bracket,"
whereas the traditional Ozzie-and-Harriet style family would get only one.
To illustrate this point in a relatively simple fashion, I have constructed a
series of examples that use contemporary dollar amounts and a "flat"
tax-actually a tax system with two brackets, 0% and 20%.67 All of the
ity if the marriage lasted for a minimum of ten years. See id. at 282-83 n.94 (con-
trasting divorced women with wives, who are eligible when married over one year,
and widows, who are eligible if married nine months prior to husband's death)
(citing 42 U.S.C. §§ 402(b) (1) (G), 416(b) (2),(c) (5) (1994)). Under this scheme,
"[a] full-time homemaker who is divorced after nine years of marriage walks away
with no social security credit for that period." Id.
62. See U.S. CONsT. amend. XVI (making personal income tax possible in
1913); MCCAFFERY, supra note 4, at 29 (noting that Sixteenth Amendment, ratified
in 1913, made income tax possible, but it was not until 1916 that "a much broader
income tax was enacted").
63. Actually, the story is more complicated than this. For a more complete
history of filing status under the income tax before 1948, see McCAFFERY, supra
note 4, Ch. 2 and the sources cited therein.
64. See id. at 16 (noting that separate filing treats husbands and wives as indi-
viduals, each paying tax under individual rate schedule and noting that this is not
same thing as "[m]arried, filing separately," which is possible under current law,
but rarely used because it would actually cause couples to pay higher taxes).
65. For a contrast to the one rate filing system, see I.R.C. § I(a)-(d) (1994)
(providing different tax rate schedules for married individuals filing jointly and
surviving spouses; heads of households; unmarried individuals; and married indi-
viduals filing separately).
66. SeeJoseph A. Pechman & Gary V. Engelhardt, The Income Tax Treatment of
the Family: An International Perspective, 43 NAT'L TAXJ. 1, 9 (1990) (noting that, out
of 11 developed countries, France, Germany and United States are only countries
to not have separate filing systems); see also McCAFFERY, supra note 4, at 16, 27-28,
68 (noting that "most advanced democracies" now adhere to system of separate
filing and this neutral system is one way to resolve problem of "marriage penalty"
in United States).
67. See.EDWARD J. MCCAFFERY, THE NEXT GREAT AMERICAN TAX REVOLT (forth-
coming 2000) (discussing popular flat-rate tax plans featuring this structure).
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relevant ideas about marriage penalties and bonuses can be captured by
looking at such a basic two-rate tax system.
To begin, consider a simple separate filing rate structure, like
America had before 1948:
INCOME TAx RATE
$0 to $10,000 0%
above $10,000 20%
TABLE 1: SIMPLE SEPARATE FILING RATE SCHEDULE
Under this schedule, a family with two workers who each earned at
least $10,000 would get $20,000 of income tax-free. But if Ozzie alone
earned $20,000, he would have to pay tax at the 20% rate on his "second"
$10,000, for a total tax of $2,000. In fact, there was a "married man's
exemption level" before 1948 that allowed married men whose wives did
not file their own tax returns to get this favorable result, but this was
limited to the bottom 75% or so of the income distribution. 68 Wealthy
Ozzies were still taxed more heavily than wealthy two-earner couples-
although few, if any, of these latter types of families existed.
To get the benefits of "income splitting"-the lower taxes that would
obtain for a household with two equal earners-many wealthy, one-earner
couples engaged in sophisticated tax planning to make it look as if they
were two-earner families.6 9 Of course, they did not really want to be such.
The law got complicated in trying to police these manipulations, which
were made worse after a series of 1930 Supreme Court decisions that made
the benefits generally available to spouses in community property states.70
68. See McCAFFERY, supra note 4, at 30-31 (revealing how 1913 and subsequent
rules provided tax break to married couples filing jointly in which only husbands
worked and earned less than $20,000, by placing them in zero bracket; however,
for singles, zero bracket only extended to $10,000).
69. See Carolyn C. Jones, Split Income and Separate Spheres: Tax Law and Gender
Roles in the 1940s, 6 LAw & HIST. REv. 259, 259 (1988) (citing various income-
splitting techniques used in common law states such as placing income-producing
property in joint tenancies or family trusts and converting businesses from
proprietorships or corporations into family partnerships); MCCAFFERY, supra note
4, at 35 (noting that couples would shift income-generating property to wives to
make it appear as if wives were earning income).
70. See Hoeper v. Tax Comm'n, 284 U.S. 206, 218 (1931) (holding that
Wisconsin statute was unconstitutional because it taxed husbands for both their
own and their wives' income); Lucas v. Earl, 281 U.S. 111, 114-15 (1930) (holding
that, despite written agreement between husband and wife that all income would
be held jointly, husband earned income and therefore, under individual system,
should be taxed on it); Poe v. Seaborn, 282 U.S. 101, 118 (1930) (holding that in
community property states husbands and wives are entitled to file separate returns,
each claiming one-half of community property as his or her own income,
regardless of which spouse earned income); see also MCCAIFERY, supra note 4, at 37-
49 (discussing Hoeper, Lucas and Seaborn).
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In 1948, as part of a large post-War "peace dividend," Ozzie got his
way: the United States adopted joint filing for married couples. 7 1 The
initial joint filing rate structure simply doubled the rate brackets in effect
for single taxpayers-so that the zero and all other rate brackets would
extend twice as high for married couples as for single taxpayers. 72 Table
2, with obviously simplified numbers, illustrates:
UNMARRIED PERSONS MARRIED PERSONS
INCOME RATE INCOME RATE
$0-$10,000 0% $0-$20,000 0%
above $10,000 20% above $20,000 20%
TABLE 2: 1948-STYLE RATE SCHEDULES
Under this schedule, Ozzie now had a $20,000 zero bracket, whether
or not Harriet worked. There were no "marriage penalties," only
"marriage bonuses" under this system. A marriage in which each spouse
earned the same amount of income would be indifferent to joint filing
because they were, in essence, doubling their rate brackets by filing
separately; they got a $20,000 zero bracket no matter what. In contrast, a
couple where one spouse, like Ozzie, was the dominant or exclusive wage
earner would now see their taxes go down because this dominant earner
could take advantage of the wider, lower rate brackets. It was no longer
necessary to pretend to be equal for tax purposes, and shortly this tax
game ceased.
The move to joint filing was justified on the basis of a "neutral"
principle-namely, that all equal-earning couples should pay equal
taxes.7 3 This "norm" has informed subsequent tax policy discussion.7 4
71. See Jones, supra note 69, at 294 (noting that Congress overrode
Presidential veto in order to introduce joint return); see also MCCAFFERY, supra note
4, at 15, 51-52 (describing how, in 1948, 'joint filing emerged once more, like a
phoenix from the ashes" seven years after mandatory joint filing proposal was first
rejected).
72. See MCCAFFERY, supra note 4, at 54-55 ("The 1948 Act set rates on married
couples equal to twice what a single person earning one-half the total family
income would pay.").
73. See H.R. REP. No. 80-1274, at 1, 21-22 (1948) (citing equalization between
states as reason behind joint filing option).
74. See Anne L. Alstott, Tax Policy and Feminism: Competing Goals and Institu-
tional Choices, 96 COLUM. L. REv. 2001, 2009-10 (1996) (noting that, under joint
filing, "a single-earner couple and a two-earner couple with equal total incomes pay
the same tax liability"); see also MichaelJ. McIntyre, Individual Filing in the Personal
Income Tax: Prolegomena to Future Discussion, 58 N.C. L. REv. 469, 472 (1980)
(favoring joint filing for married couples because it allows for "married couples
with equal income to pay equal tax," which would not be possible under individual
filing system). Professor McIntyre asserts that married couples, especially two-
earner couples, pool their financial resources and that this is the first premise for
joint filing. See id. at 469-70, 472 (noting that pooling is almost unavoidable and
[Vol. 44: p. 445
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The actual, historical reality is that the particular 1948 reform was only
one way to effect this norm. A proposal in 1941 for mandatory joint filing
at the singles rate schedules would have had all equal-earning married
couples pay equal tax too, but at a higher rate. 75 This plan was wildly
unpopular.76 The "equal-earning couples" norm is also only one among
several "neutral" norms, including that each person should pay tax based
on his or her own income whether married or not-a procedure of
separate filing that would be "marriage neutral." Most importantly,
however, the "equal-earning couples" norm is selective in its
understanding of the economic facts of life. One-earner couples have a
larger economic income in the form of the valuable household services
that stay-at-home parents provide. 7 7 Correspondingly, two-worker couples
have greater work-related costs than Ozzie and Harriet do. A perfectly
fair-and "neutral"-income tax policy would give two-earner families
some deduction for their greater work-related costs, which would also
serve as an effective proxy for getting at the greater real income that one-
earner families, with their valuable untaxed self-supplied domestic
services, have.7 8 We didn't do that. Instead, the particular neutral
principle we adopted in 1948 was one that created a windfall gain for
wealthy Ozzie-and-Harriet style families.
At the same time, there was a very large hidden burden in the 1948
move to joint filing and its many marriage bonuses. Joint filing created a
secondary-earner bias, because a potential second worker-at the margin
benefits from expenditures are not likely to favor one spouse over other). The
second premise is that marital pooling alters an individual's economic
circumstances and this "should be reflected in determining a married person's
taxable capacity." Id. Under the joint filing system, couples are taxed on their
aggregate income (without regard to individual contributions), which arguably
reflects the "taxable capacity of each partner" and supports the policy that
"requires married couples with equal income to pay equal tax." Id.; see Michael J.
McIntyre & Oliver Oldman, Taxation of the Family in a Comprehensive and Simplified
Income Tax, 90 HARV. L. REv. 1573, 1589-92 (1977) (noting that it is "a well-
established feature of our tax structure since 1948, that couples with equal income
should be taxed equally" and discussing conflict between this feature and
suggested reform to marriage neutral taxation).
75. See McCAFFERY, supra note 4, at 49 (discussing Roosevelt administration's
"proposal to tax all married couples as if they were a single unmarried person").
76. See RANDOLPH E. PAUL, TAXATION IN THE UNITED STATES 273-75 (1954)
(discussing opposition to 1941 provision requiring that husbands and wives file
joint returns); see also McCAFFERY, supra note 4, at 49-51 (noting "death" of 1941
proposal and that same fate occurred for identical proposal in 1942).
77. See C1AlRE M. RENZETrI & DANIEL J. CURRAN, WOMEN, MEN, AND SOCIETY
139 (2d ed. 1992) (noting that, despite modem conveniences and labor-saving
devices, "the 1980s homemaker spent about as much time on household chores as
the 17 80s homemaker did"); Staudt, supra note 8, at 1580 ("Sociological studies
indicate that despite labor-saving appliances and women's move into the market,
the number of hours women work in the home has remained constant.").
78. See McCAFFERY, supra note 4, at 133-34 (suggesting that providing subsidies
to second income earners or allowing child-care deductions may solve problem of
disparate tax treatment for two-earner families).
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of the household earning decision-would now enter the income tax rate
structure in a rate bracket dictated by the primary earner's salary.79 This
secondary-earner bias is conceptually distinct from the question of the
marriage penalty and can be seen as 'discouraging women's paid work.80
Indeed, there is evidence that this effect was intentional-that Congress
was attracted to a policy that would generate incentives for women to
return to the homes that they had left, at least briefly, during World War
11.81 As Stanley Surrey, a prominent government official and later
Harvard Law Professor, put it, in commenting on the 1948 change with
approval: "Wives need not continue to master the details of the retail drug
business, electrical equipment business, or construction business, but may
turn from their partnership 'duties' to the pursuit of homemaking."8 2
Harriet could go home again, tax-free.
2. Growth
The secondary-earner bias of the income tax with joint filing in-
creased over time as "bracket creep"-the failure to adjust the tax rate
schedules for the effects of inflation-brought more and more middle
and lower-middle income households into the income tax system.8 3
Under joint filing, Harriet, should she decide to go into the paid
workforce, would enter the labor market at a tax rate dictated by Ozzie's
salary. This bias simply added to the bias under the social security system
because Harriet would also start paying social security contributions
although, as we have just seen, she would get no personal benefit from
them.8 4 Still at the same time, the tax laws made no general provision for
the costs of having two workers. As a matter of general "neutral" princi-
ples, a court case decided in 1939 ruled that child-care costs were not gen-
erally deductible as a "business" expense because they were caused by the
"personal" decision to have children-although the decision of the
caregiver to work was the actual proximate cause of the need for third
79. See id., at 19 (noting that unlike marriage penalty, secondary-earner bias is
important at all income levels).
80. See generally Jane H. Leuthold, Income Splitting & Women's Labor-Force
Participation, 38 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REv. 98 (1984) (discussing effect of income
splitting on labor-force participation of wives and concluding that "elimination of
income splitting would probably increase significantly the labor-force participation
of married women").
81. See MCCAFFERY, supra note 4, at 99-100 (noting strong social norm within
United States that women's work outside home be marginal or secondary); see also
Zelenak, supra note 7, at 1021-48 (same).
82. Stanley S. Surrey, Federal Taxation of the Family-The Revenue Act of 1948, 61
HARv. L. REv. 1097, 1111 (1948).
83. See generally Grace Ganz Blumberg, Sexism in the Code: A Comparative Study
of Income Taxation of Working Wives and Mothers, 21 BUFF. L. REv. 49 (1972) (discuss-
ing income splitting and other elements of taxation of working wives in United
States compared to other countries).
84. For a discussion of the effect of making social security contributions, see
supra notes 53-55 and accompanying text.
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party care. 85 All of these burdens conspire to make it increasingly finan-
cially difficult to be a two-worker household. In a wide range of cases,
married mothers lose money by working outside the home;8 6 on average,
two-earner families see two-thirds of their second income go to taxes and
additional work-related expenses. 87
At the very same time, of course, the number of two-earner house-
holds was escalating dramatically, as married women continued to enter
the workforce as shown in Figure 2, above. Still, the secondary-earner bias
of the tax and social security systems was barely noticed. The resulting gap
between images of the core family built into the tax and other socio-eco-
nomic systems, on the one hand, and reality, on the other, meant that
women everywhere were facing hard and stressful choices. The precise
effects varied with economic class. Poor women found themselves alone as
single heads of households, at least in part because two-worker couples
were not viable among the working poor. Middle-class women confronted
hard choices between working full-time inside the home, or inside and
outside the home for scant, if important, financial gains. 88 Upper-class
women saw that their work outside the home was poorly rewarded and so
continued to live out the core lifestyle of Harriet. 8
9
It was not the secondary-earner bias but an altogether different bur-
den of the 1948 joint filing benefits decision that drew attention and ulti-
mate action. Joint filing had created what came to be known as the
"singles penalty."90 This was the precise converse of the "marriage bonus":
by forswearing a possible marriage bonus, high-earning singles could be
seen as incurring a penalty.9 ' An unmarried Ozzie making $20,000 would
envy an equal-earning Ozzie who had found a Harriet to stay home, cook
dinner, rear the kids-and lower the household taxes. It is not hard to
85. See McGAFFERY, supra note 4, at 111-14 (discussing Smith v. Commissioner, 40
B.T.A. 1038 (1939), affd, 113 F.2d 114 (2d Cir. 1940), in which Board of Tax
Appeals ruled childcare expenses were nondeductible because they were caused by
personal decision to have children).
86. See generally EdwardJ. McCaffery, Taxing Women: How the Tax Code Discrimi-
nates Against Women and Families, 17 CAL. LAw. 39 (Apr. 1997).
87. See generally McCAFFERY, supra note 4, at 137-62 (focusing on tax conse-
quences for working women in low, middle and high income families).
88. See generally ARLIE HOCHSCHILD, THE SECOND SHIFT: WORKING PARENTS
AND THE REVOLUTION AT HOME (1989).
89. See Edward J. McCaffery, Slouching Towards Equality: Gender Discrimination,
Market Efficiency, and Social Change, 103 YALE L.J. 595, 625 (1993) (noting that be-
cause women get lower wages, many cut back on education and employment op-
portunities); see also McCAFFERY, supra note 4, at 20-23 (noting that secondary-
earner bias is main problem).
90. See Nancy E. Shurtz, Taxing Women: Thoughts on a Gendered Economy, 6 S.
CAL. REV. L. & WOMEN'S STUD. 485, 499 (Spr. 1997) (concluding that "singles'
penalty" led to "adoption by Congress in .1969 of a new tax schedule for single
persons fixing their federal income tax liability at a level no more than 20% of that
of an equal-income married couple").
91. See id. (noting that single taxpayers could pay as much as 42.1% more
than married couple with same total income).
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imagine what demographic group was most hurt by the singles penalty-
wealthy unmarried men. Congress rushed to their rescue, and lowered the
rate brackets for joint filing by 20% in 1969.92
In our continuing simplified example, the rate structure now looks
something like:
UNMARRIED PERSONS MARRIED PERSONS
INCOME RATE INCOME RATE
$0-$10,000 0% $0-$16,000 0%
above $10,000 20% above $16,000 20%
TABLE 3: 1969-STYLE RATE SCHEDULES
Ozzie and Harriet now have a $16,000 zero bracket-better than they
had before 1948, but worse than they had for the years from .1948 to 1969.
This adjustment lowered the "singles penalty," by reducing the disparity
between the married and single person zero bracket level from 2 times to
1.6 times. The resulting "married filing jointly" rate structure has
persisted to this day. It features two potentially offsetting effects. On the
one hand, married couples receive a benefit of implicit income-splitting,
where each spouse is presumed to earn an equal amount, brought about
by joint filing.93 Ozzie and Harriet get a $16,000 zero bracket, just as if
they had each earned $8,000, even if Harriet does not in fact engage in
paid work outside the home. On the other hand, married couples suffer
the burden of a less favorable rate structure, brought about by the 1969
change. A truly egalitarian couple would get $20,000 worth of tax-free
income if unmarried, but only $16,000 if married. Because the "married,
filing separately" rate structure is set at one-half of the joint filing one, it
contains only the detriment of the adverse rates without the benefits of the
deemed income-splitting. (That is, its zero bracket extends only to
$8,000). Separate filing under the current system is thus rarely a viable
option, with more than 97% of married couples-quite rationally-filing
jointly.9 4 For roughly equal-earner couples, the harms outweigh the
benefits, and these couples pay a "marriage penalty." For largely one-
earner couples, the converse is true, and these couples continue to receive
a benefit or "marriage bonus."
92. See id.
93. See H.J. Cummins, Catch 1040 Joint Returns Mean Joint Liability-And In
Some Cases, That Means Trouble, NEWSDAV, Jan. 30, 1994, at *2, available in 1994 WL
7442627 (reporting that "outside researchers say that up to 99 percent of
American couples file jointly because there is almost always a tax savings").
94. See MCCAFFERY, supra note 4, at 31 (noting that historically 97.2% of
married couples filed joint tax returns).
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The secondary-earner bias has existed since at least 1948 and yet it has
never drawn much attention. 95 It affects principally women. "Marriage
penalties," in contrast, have existed only since 1969, and they have drawn a
lot of attention.9 6 Such penalties fall on all married couples, including the
core, Ozzie-and-Harriet style families. This may seem counterintuitive at
first-it may seem as if only two-earner couples pay a penalty because only
their taxes actually increase on marriage. Yet the core families were hurt
just as much as the newly emergent two-earner families were in 1969.
Their taxes went up, too, and their taxes would go down if we returned to
the 1948-style schedules. This is an important social fact for the rest of the
story.
By the late 1990s, approximately 50% of all married couples were
paying a marriage penalty of up to $4,000 per couple. 97 Approximately
40% of couples, typically consisting of a working man and a stay-at-home
woman, were receiving marriage bonuses. 98 The prevalence of marriage
penalties was directly caused by the increase in working, married women.
Following the inclusion of rather limited marriage penalty relief in the
1994 Contract with America99 and other events, the "marriage penalty"
attained a high degree of political salience in the mid to late 1990s.
100
Stories about the penalty ran on the front pages of major metropolitan
newspapers, in leading popular magazines and on television and talk radio
shows across the country.
10 1
95. See id. at 34, 58-59 (discussing secondary earning bias).
96. See id. at 34, 64-66 (articulating drawbacks of marriage penalties on
women).
97. Richard B. Malamud, Allocation of the Joint Return Marriage Penalty and
Bonus, 15 VA. TAX REv. 489, 493 (1996) (noting that "one recent study reports that
52 percent of the taxpayers who file ajoint return pay a marriage penalty while 38
percent receive a marriage bonus").
98. See Daniel R. Feenberg & Harvey S. Rosen, Recent Developments in the
Marriage Tax, 48 NAT'L TAX J. 91, 91 (1995).
99. See CONTRACT WITH AMERICA: THE BOLD PLAN By REP. NEWT GINGRICH,
REP. DICK ARMEY, AND THE HOUSE REPUBLICANS TO CHANGE THE NATION (Ed
Gillespie & Bob Schellhas eds., 1994); see also CONTRACT WITH THE AMERICAN
FAMILY: A BOLD PLAN BY CHRISTIAN COALITION TO STRENGTHEN THE FAMILY AND
RESTORE COMMON-SENSE VALUES (1995); MCCAFFERY, supra note 4, at 205-25
(same); Edward J. McCaffery, Tax's Empire, 85 GEO. L.J. 71, 128-37 (1996)
(discussing two Contracts and their talk of tax).
100. See McCAFFERY, supra note 4, at 19 (noting that from 1980 to 1995,
phrase "marriage penalty" appeared in more than 350 articles in New York Times
and Washington Post combined).
101. See id. (discussing entrance of phrase "marriage penalty" into national
consciousness).
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3. Entrenchment
The marriage penalty finally became a salient political issue and there
have been numerous proposals to eliminate or lessen it.10 2 But the ongo-
ing, unfolding story of marriage penalty reform only underscores the prin-
cipal themes of this essay. Marriage bonuses to the core cases have come
to be taken for granted-a fixed point in all political discussions. This
political fact has shaped and limited any meaningful attempt to help wo-
men or modern, two-earner families-in other words, non-core cases.
To understand this point, consider four broad approaches for dealing
with the problem of marriage penalties:
" One, the law could abandon joint filing and move to separate filing, as
most advanced democratic nations have done.10 3 Such a system would
be marriage neutral-it would have neither marriage penalties nor bo-
nuses in it. It would eliminate the secondary-earner bias under present
income tax law. It would benefit two-earner families and hurt one-
earner ones.
* Two, the law could give spouses the option to file separately, as if unmar-
ried. This would differ from the current, almost always unfavorable op-
tion to be "married filing separately" today, because it would allow
separate filers to have the benefits of the more favorable single person's
rate schedules. That is, in the example I have been using, each spouse
could get a $10,000 zero bracket, not an $8,000 one. This system would
get rid of marriage penalties while leaving marriage bonuses in place. It
would lessen, though not eliminate, the secondary-earner bias under ex-
isting income tax law. It would benefit two-earner couples and leave
one-earner ones unaffected.
* Three, the law could revert to 1948-style joint filing rate brackets. This
would eliminate marriage penalties and would also increase marriage bo-
nuses for families receiving them. It would leave the secondary earner
bias largely unaffected. This would benefit all married couples whether
two-earner or not.
* Four, the law could provide ad hoc and partial relief to two-earner fami-
lies by giving better child-care relief or providing for a secondary-earner
deduction or credit.
In the early 1980s, marriage penalty relief had been briefly discussed
in Congress as the increasing number of working married women made
their concerns salient.10 4 There was talk of Options One or Two, separate
102. See, e.g., Mervin M. Wilf, Planning Techniques for Large Estates, SD33 A.L.I.-
A.B.A. 1677, 1722 (Nov. 16, 1998) (discussing two bills introduced in Congress that
are designed to eliminate marriage penalty).
103. SeeJ.D. Bryce, A Critical Evaluation of The Tax Crits, 76 N.C. L. REv. 1687,
1725 (1998) (concluding that while mandatory individual filing would eliminate
marriage penalty, it is "full of complexity").
104. See MCCAFFERY, supra note 4, at 74-78 (discussing hearings held before
enactment of section 221). At the hearings before Congress, several experts testi-
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or optional separate filing.105 But because neither of these plans would
help core Ozzie-and-Harriet families and because Option One would ac-
tively hurt them by raising their taxes, there was little enthusiasm for
them. 10 6 Instead, Option Four carried that particular day, with a limited
secondary-earner deduction, put in place in 1981.107 This law gave two-
earner families a deduction of 10% of the lesser earner's salary, up to a
maximum deduction of $3,000-the latter a provision continuing a long-
standing theme in the tax laws that such relief be limited to lower and
middle-income households. For most two-earner families who qualified,
the benefit was worth less than $450, about $9 a week.1 08 Pamela Gann
noted that this secondary-earner relief was a limited attempt to address the
structural problems disfavoring working wives, but accepted it as a helpful
first step.1 0 9 In fact, it turned out to a be a last step. Congress repealed
the law in 1986 as a general rate reduction effectively moved the law in the
direction of Option Three-the one and only option benefitting core fam-
ilies as well as non-core ones.
1 10
The marriage penalty returned to center stage in the mid to late
1990s, beginning with the Contract with America's drawing attention to it as
part of the immoral and corrupt government system.'11 There is good
reason-starting with the extreme stinginess of the Contract's marriage
fled about the marriage penalty, including Pamela Gann and economist June
O'Neill. See id. at 74.
105. See id. at 74-75 (discussing proposed filing options). Representative Fen-
wick proposed that couples be given the option of filing jointly or separately. See
id. at 74. This proposal would have allowed both the working married women and
non-working women to benefit from the best tax treatment because working wo-
men could take advantage of the single filer's schedule. See id. The problem, in
the eyes of Congress, was that the net result would be less taxes collected. See id.
106. See id. at 75 (discussing return to pre-1948 mandatory single filing). The
obvious result of mandatory single filing is that traditional married couples would
lose the benefits of joint filing, thus raising their taxes. See id.
107. See id. When adopted in 1981, section 221 read in relevant part:
(a) Deduction Allowed.-,
(1) In general.-In the case of a joint return under section 6013 for the
taxable year, there shall be allowed as a deduction an amount equal to 10
percent of the lesser of-,
(A) $30,000, or
(B) the qualified earned income of the spouse with the lower qualified
earned income for such taxable year.
Tax Reform Act of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-34, § 103(a), 95 Stat. 172 (repealed 1986).
108. See Pamela B. Gann, The Earned Income Deduction: Congress's 1981 Response
to the "Marriage Penalty" Tax, 68 CORNELL L. RPv. 468, 478-81 (1983) (containing
tables breaking down amounts under section 221, broken down by income).
109. See id. at 485-87 (noting that true separate filing is best solution, but ac-
cepting section 221 as starting point).
110. See Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, § 131(a), 100 Stat. 2113
(1986) (repealing section 221).
111. See McCAFFERY, supra note 4, at 205 (noting that taxes and morality have
long been linked and that Republicans in CONTaCT WITH AMERICA used this in
arguing for lower taxes for "traditional" families). Conservative Republicans were
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penalty relief itself - to believe that Republicans were being disingenu-
ous. 112 Social conservatives liked the ,rhetoric of complaining about the
"marriage tax" more than the reality of helping two-worker families. Talk
that the tax system was anti-marriage helped to fuel a more general Repub-
lican agenda to reduce and to radically reform taxes altogether. But, per-
haps to their chagrin, Republicans soon found out that marriage penalty
relief was indeed a popular issue.
In this environment, in 1997, Representatives David McIntosh and
Jerry Weller, both Republicans, proposed a "Marriage Tax Elimination
Act"113 that would have given couples the option to file separately and
singly, as if they were unmarried-Option Two above.1 14 This proposal
would have eliminated the marriage penalties prevailing under present
law while leaving unchanged the marriage bonuses. In other words, it
would have helped the 50% or so of two-earner couples who would make
the election to file separately, but do nothing for the 40% of one-earner
couples benefitting from lower taxes under joint filing. 115 McIntosh-Wel-
ler I, as it came to be known, was estimated to cost about $20 billion in
arguing for both lower taxes and "family values." See id. at 205-06. In the Contract
with America, the Republicans stated:
Our Contract with America recognizes families for what they are-the basic
building block of society. Renewing the American Dream is our goal, and
renewing that dream starts at home, with the family. To help families
reach their American Dream, our Contract calls for [a] $500-per-child-tax-
credit to make raising children a little more affordable .... Then we'll
begin to repeal the marriage tax penalty. The government should re-
ward, not punish, those who enter into the sacred bonds of marriage.
CONTRACT WITH AMERICA, supra note 99, at 85.
112. See McCAFFERY, supra note 4, at 217-18. The fact is that the relief pro-
posed by the CONTRACT WITH AMERICA would be at most $145 per year per family.
See id. at 217 (comparing this small amount of relief to much larger relief for fami-
lies with children, $500 per child). Even this amount would only be available to
couples with a large disparity in earnings, not couples who were equal in earnings.
See id.
113. See H.R. 2456, 105th Cong. (1997); see also S. 1285, 105th Cong. (1997)
(containing Senate version of same proposed act).
114. The proposed section was to read, in relevant part, as follows:
SEC. 6013A. Combined return with separate rates.
a) GENERAL RULE.-A Husband and wife may make a combined re-
turn of income taxes under Subtitle A under which-
(1) a separate taxable income is determined for each spouse by ap-
plying the rules provided in this section, and
(2) the tax imposed by section 1 is the aggregate amount resulting
from applying the separate rates set forth in section 1 (c) to each such
taxable income.
H.R. 2456, 105th Cong. (1997).
115. See DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY, INDIVIDUAL INCOME TAx RETURNS 1995
§ 3, at 33 (1995) [hereinafter 1995 RETURNS] (containing table breaking down all
tax returns in 1995). Of these, approximately 49 million were returns filed jointly
by married couples, and only 2.8 million were separate returns filed by married
individuals. See id.
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foregone revenues each year.116 President Clinton and his fellow Demo-
crats failed to endorse the bill, instead preferring deficit reduction and
social spending programs, and it more or less died on the vine. 117
Let us pause for a moment and notice the dog that is not barking.
There is a strong intellectual case to be made for Option One, true sepa-
rate filing, which would eliminate the marriage bonuses now prevailing
and thus would be less expensive than Option Two. Democrats and femi-
nists concerned with the general budget situation but eager to do some-
thing for women and modern, two-earner families could have advanced
this proposal. Separate filing is "marriage neutral," has precedence in our
American past (pre-1948) and is now widely used around the world. 118
Yet no serious American politician proposed such mandatory separate fil-
ing, and for a fairly obvious reason: It would have been political suicide.
So firmly have the marriage bonuses created by the implicit benefits pro-
gram of 1948 been accepted into the status quo that their repeal would
certainly be portrayed as a tax increase on traditional families and an as-
sault on "family values."
Meanwhile, socially conservative Republicans such as Phyllis Schafly
criticized McIntosh-Weller I for not helping one-earner families. 119 Rep-
resentatives McIntosh and Weller then proposed another Marriage Tax
Elimination Act, popularly known as McIntosh-Weller 11.120 This act
116. See 143 CONG. Rxc. H8574-01 (daily ed. Oct. 7, 1997) (statement of Rep.
Blunt) (observing that dual-income couples who file jointly pay greater taxes be-
cause they fall in higher income bracket). Representative Blunt estimated that by
allowing truly separate returns, the Federal Government would lose about $30 bil-
lion in income. See id.
117. This is not to say, however, that the topic is completely dead. In fact,
Representative Weller continues to push for the adoption of a recent version of
the Marriage Tax Elimination Act on the floor of the House. See 145 CONG. REc.
H1271-02 (Mar. 16, 1999) (statement of Rep. Weller) (commenting that with solid
financial condition of country, some money could be sacrificed in allowing true
separate filing for dual-income couples). For further discussion of subsequent ver-
sions of the Marriage Tax Elimination Act, see infra notes 120-23 and accompany-
ing text.
118. See McCAFFERY, supra note 4, at 27 (noting that most countries use sepa-
rate filing). A 1990 survey revealed that of eleven developed countries, only
three-the United States, Germany and France-still use a system of joint filing.
See id. The remaining eight countries "consider the individual as the tax unit, re-
flecting the world-wide trend in developed countries away from joint taxation of
married couples." Pechman & Englehardt, supra note 66, at 22.
119. See, e.g., Phyllis Schlafly, Watch Out for Marriage Tax Reform (visited March
23, 1999) <http://www.eagleforum.org/column/1998_columns.html> (discussing
how McIntosh-Weller I discriminates against one-earner families by providing no
tax benefits to them).
120. H.R. 6, 107th Cong. (1999) (proposing to "eliminate the marriage pen-
alty by providing that the income tax rate bracket amounts, and the amount of the
standard deduction, for joint returns shall be twice the amounts applicable to un-
married individuals"). For example, under this most recent version, the tax rate
for joint returns would be 15% for a combined income of up to $51,500, twice the
income of a single tax payer in the 15% bracket. See id.
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would expand the marriage "penalty" relief to all married couples by
doubling the rate brackets; that is, it would be a return to 1948-style rate
brackets. 12 ' This is Option Three above-the one plan that would elimi-
nate marriage penalties and also benefit the core, Ozzie-and-Harriet style
model. McIntosh-Weller II differed from McIntosh-Weller I principally by
increasing marriage bonuses for one-earner couples; equal-earner couples
were treated the same under the two versions.1 22 Republicans thus re-
sponded to Democratic inertia on the first version of marriage penalty
relief by upping the stakes: McIntosh-Weller II was estimated to cost $30
billion a year. 123
The saga of marriage penalty relief nicely illustrates this Article's prin-
cipal themes. In 1948, Congress created a benefits program specifically to
reward and entrench the core patriarchal model of the family. No one
much noticed the burdens that the benefits decision put on non-core
cases, especially working wives and two-earner couples. Only when these
burdens also reached out to touch core cases was there any serious at-
tempt to redress them. But by this point in time, the initial "benefit" had
lost its status as such and was taken as part of the status quo. Always de-
fended in neutral terms-however contestably these terms ought to have
been-the marriage bonuses built into the law have now become a fixed
point on which all future reform must build. We cannot help modern-
style, non-core cases without increasing the largesse we have already shown
to Ozzie and Harriet, who can go on living happily ever after.
C. Common Ground
The social security and marriage bonus stories have much in com-
mon. In both cases, one-earner, two-parent families are the big winners
and two-earner families are the big losers. Yet neither program is per-
ceived as a "benefits" one. This is also true of the broader systems in
which they operate: social security is still widely thought of as an entitle-
ment, and no one in his or her right mind would consider the tax system,
writ large, as a government assistance program. Still the structure of mar-
riage and one-earner family bonuses under both social security and the
income tax system is very much a benefits program-a conscious, struc-
121. Compare id., with McCAFFERY, supra note 4, at 16, tbl.2.
122. Compare H.R. 2456, 105th Cong. (1997), with H.R. 6, 108th Cong. (1999)
(noting differences in proposals). The former aids working couples by allowing
them to be treated as individual taxpayers, thus not bringing them into a higher
tax bracket by combining their incomes. See H.R. 2456, 105th Cong. (1997) ("[A]
husband and wife may make a combined return of income taxes... [in which] a
separate taxable income is determined for each spouse . . ."). This does nothing
for one-earner families. See id. The latter, on the other hand, by doubling tax
brackets benefits both the dual-income and the single-income families by allowing
each to file in a lower tax bracket. See H.R. 6, 105th Cong. (1999).
123. See Dori Meinert, Weller Renews Marriage Penalty Repeal Effort, COPLEY NEWS
SERVICE, Feb. 10, 1999, at 1, available in LExIs, News Library (stating that Weller's
bill would cost $30 billion in lost revenue).
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tural decision that rewards traditional, core families. Yet both are de-
fended, when they are noticed at all, as being "neutral." Reform efforts
take the benefits for granted. There is no consequentialist talk here-of
"bang for the buck" and so forth. The provisions, again when they are
noticed at all, are defended as being neutral, fair or matters of right. In
short and in sum, Ozzie and Harriet win-simply, quietly, efficiently and
eternally.
III. THE DISPLACED MODEL: OZZIE DOESN'T LIVE HERE ANYMORE
A. ADC/AFDC/TANF
1. Humble Beginnings
In turning to the Displaced Model, we confront immediately a termi-
nology problem in discussing the classic benefits program, "welfare." Ac-
ronyms tell a good deal of the story. The program began as Aid to
Dependent Children (ADC) 124 in 1935, part of the same Social Security
Act that instituted the old age assistance and retirement program dis-
cussed above. But whereas the benefits structure of social security has re-
mained both obscure and impervious to change-the steady trend as we
have seen has been to increase the bonus given to Ozzie-and-Harriet style
core families-"welfare" has been both highly visible and vulnerable to
shifting political currents. 125
As initially set up, welfare focused on children, as suggested by the
acronym "ADC" itself. The mother was an invisible phenomenon in this
label, presumed in the fact of there being a child who needed aid. ADC
was motivated by a sense of the sympathetic non-core case or Cinderella
story. The benefits substituted rather explicitly for an absent father with-
out affecting the mother's role: she would stay at home, as in the core
case.1 26 Linda Gordon and other scholars have done fine work to expose
the various assumptions in play during the creation of welfare. 127 These
included a mix of some good intentions with a good deal of racism, elitism
124. 49 Stat. 620, 627 (1935).
125. See CONTRACT I, supra note 99, at 65-77 (asking "[i]sn't it time for the
government to encourage work rather than rewarding dependancy?"). The
Republicans' CONTRACT WITH AMERICA goes on to vow to change the welfare state
by encouraging responsibility and reducing illegitimacy. See id. at 66-77.
126. See 49 Stat. 620, 629 (1935) (requiring that state plans provide for chil-
dren who have been deprived of support by reason of death, absence or incapacity
of parent).
127. LINDA GORDON, PITIED BUT NOT ENTITLED: SINGLE MOTHERS AND THE
HISTORY OF WELFARE, 1890-1935 42 (1994) (noting how welfare involved racist and
elitist assumptions); see also MIMI ABRAMOVITZ, REGULATING THE LIVEs OF WOMEN:
SOCIAL WELFARE POLICY FROM COLONIAL TIMES TO THE PRESENT 63 (1988) (discuss-
ing good and bad effects of welfare); Brito, supra note 13 (discussing welfare and
assumptions regarding women); Fineman, supra note 16, at 101 (noting racism
and elitism associated with welfare); Williams, supra note 12, at 720 (discussing bad
assumptions underlying welfare).
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and other forms of prejudice. 128 But patriarchy and the patriarchal core
family concern us most in this essay, and gendered stereotypes were
plainly present in the genesis of ADC.
The initial ADC program was designed with the core model in mind,
to assimilate certain "worthy" non-core cases into the Ozzie-and-Harriet
core model. The idea was to keep the custodial mother at home with her
children, where she belonged. ADC was, in the words of one of its charter
documents, "designed to release from the wage-earning role the person
whose natural function is to give her children the physical and affectionate
guardianship necessary not alone to keep them from falling into social
misfortune, but more affirmatively to make them citizens capable of con-
tributing to society.' 29
The history of the early efforts to get ADC up and running reveals the
program as a highly constrained set of compromises, enacted in the face
of an often reluctant political system more concerned with aiding the core
cases falling under traditional social security. 130 Welfare has always been
limited in both its dollars and its reach. Framers of the program re-
quested initial funding meant to serve only a portion of the then-known
female-headed families with children, thereby "express [ing] their desire to
make this an elite assistance program, to serve only the deserving, perhaps
even the exemplary." 131 The primary mechanism for selectivity was the
structural decision to give states discretion through various explicitly nor-
mative standards to limit benefits to cases deemed "worthy" or where there
was a "suitable home" or some such thing.132
Open-ended concepts such as "worthiness" acquired a rather specific
meaning, befitting the general intent behind ADC.13 3 It was, in essence,
those non-core cases that might plausibly become core ones-those "dis-
placed" from the patriarchal paradigm by the trying times of the Great
128. See Fineman, supra note 16, at 101.
129. ABRAMOVITZ, supra note 127, at 318-19 (quoting The Report of the Committee
on Economic Security).
130. See id. (noting how ADC was created to help non-core cases).
131. GORDON, supra note 127, at 257.
132. See id. (noting limitations on candidates); see also ABRAmOviTZ, supra note
127, at 1320 (discussing selectivity for program).
133. See Roger J.R. Levesque, The Role of Unwed Fathers in Welfare Law: Failing
Legislative Initiatives and Surrendering Judicial Responsibility, 12 LAW & INEQ. J. 93, 98
(1993) (discussing intention behind enactment of ADC to provide support only to
those considered "worthy," namely, white widows with children). A major vehicle
for defining "worthy" was the discretion given to the states to consider the morals
of a mother in determining whether she was eligible for assistance. See id. States
seized on this discretion and used morality-based restrictions to enforce social con-
structs of who constituted worthy poor. See id. For example:
Children were disqualified because their homes were not "suitable" (e.g.,
illegitimate children were considered as proof of the mother's immoral
behavior and unsuitability), because their mothers were employable
(black women were considered able to work), or because they had "sub-
stitute parents" in the form of their mothers' amorous relationships with
men.
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Depression-that got the goods. The explicit consequentialism in the
above-quoted passage goes hand-in-hand with this theme. ADC was con-
sciously designed to help those children "capable of contributing to soci-
ety." It was, in short and in sum, an investment by the core in some, but
not all, non-core cases. A standard for subsequent evaluations and
reevaluations of the program was set.
The broad idea behind ADC, as in the Social Security Act generally
and other pieces of early New Deal legislation, was to deal on an emer-
gency basis with the dislocations that a free market economy was imposing
on civil society.1 3 4 The Great Depression had disrupted normal life, and
there was a rise of fatherless children, white children in particular, to con-
sider.1 35 The pattern of legislation and other elements of the historical
record suggests that the intent behind ADC was to help those potentially
core families temporarily thrown outside the core.' 3 6 Other families were
never meant to be part of the core to begin with; they were not seen as
displaced, but rather misplaced. 137
Id.; see WINIFRED BELL, AID TO DEPENDENT CHILDREN 3-19 (1965) (discussing intent
of ADC to assist worthy poor); MIcHAEL B. KATz, IN THE SHADOW OF THE POOR-
HOUSE: A SocLA HISTORY OF WELFARE IN AMERICA 237 (1986) (same).
134. See Kathleen A. Kost & Frank W. Munger, Fooling All of the People Some of
the Time: 1990's Welfare Reform and the Exploitation of American Values, 4 VA. J. Soc.
POL'Y & L. 3, 96-97 (1996) (discussing federal government response to economic
crisis of Great Depression by redistributing cost of poverty through New Deal legis-
lation). The authors explain the political and economic underpinning of the New
Deal programs:
The Great Depression's exacerbation of the chronic structural problems
of unemployment and poverty relief generated massive political support
for legislation establishing a federal role. All of the Social Security Act's
programs created federally administered mechanisms for redistributing
the costs of poverty relief by directly subsidizing state programs, creating
national reserves or contingency funds, and organizing the efforts of
wage earners, employers, and states to reduce the effects of competition
that would otherwise undermine provision on a subnational scale.
Id.
135. See generally FREDERICK E. HOSEN, THE GREAT DEPRESSION AND THE NEW
DEAL 37 (1992) (discussing New Deal legislation directed toward' economy and
data reflecting actual conditions during Great Depression); see also Brad S. Sears,
Rounding Out the Table: Opening an Impoverished Poverty Discourse to Community Voices,
30 HI- v. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 299, 332 (1995). Sears explains the rise of fatherless
white children after the Depression and the government's response:
Welfare came into being in 1935 to assist widows and their children. Why
was that? Not because we wanted to support or assist African American
females, but because of the Great Depression and the national economic
crisis of the 1930s, when a lot of white businessmen threw themselves
from their office windows and left widows and kids. That's why we have
the system we have today.
Id.
136. See Kost & Munger, supra note 134, at 97 (discussing intent of ADC to
help those outside core).
137. See GORDON, supra note 127, at 227 (noting how some families were
never seen as core families).
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Blacks were particularly suspect. "Blacks were systematically deprived
of access to ADC benefits: In 1937-40 only 14-17 percent of recipients were
black, far below their proportion of need."1 3 8 Contemporary scholarship
has done much to show the "accommodations with racism" built into the
very foundations of welfare.' 39 To limit government largesse to core-
white-cases, the system gave local bureaucracies much discretion, to be
exercised under explicitly normative standards that made reference to the
consequentialist spirit of the program. 140 The civil servants played their
parts. As a field supervisor reported in the late 1930s, near the dawn of
ADC:
The number of Negro cases is few due to the unanimous feeling
on the part of the staff and board that there are more work op-
portunities for Negro women and to their intense desire not to
interfere with local labor conditions. The attitude that they have
always gotten along, and that "all they'll do is have more chil-
dren" is definite .... There is hesitancy on the part of lay boards
to advance too rapidly over the thinking of their own communi-
ties, which see no reason why the employable Negro mother
should not continue her usually sketchy seasonal labor or indefi-
nite domestic service rather than receive a public assistant
grant. 141
The shocking racism of this description underscores what ADC was and
was not. It was a limited program meant to get those cases that looked like
core ones through the Great Depression, and nothing more. It was
designed to protect Cinderella's children, in part by keeping their mom at
home, until things got better-at which time the kids could pay back their
Uncle Sam.
138. Id.
139. SeeJILL QUANDANGO, THE TRANSFORMATION OF OLD AGE SECURITY: CLASS
POLITICS IN THE AMERICAN WELFARE SYSTEM 16 (1988) (discussing how ADC ena-
bled racist distribution by empowering states with discretionary powers).
Quandango notes:
With regard to ADC in particular, allowing states to set their own benefits
has been called a "compromise with racism," as it permitted the Southern
states to continue unequal treatment of blacks and whites through its dif-
ferential funding of the various Social Security programs.
Id.; see Williams, supra note 12, at 719-22 (discussing perpetuation of racism in ADC
framework).
140. SeeJ1LL QUANDANGO, THE COLOR OF WELFARE: How RACISM UNDERMINED
THE WAR ON POVERTY 21 (1994) (explaining how states exploited discretion
granted in federal welfare provisions to exclude African-Americans from govern-
ment entitlement programs). The federal system specially excluded agricultural
and domestic workers from coverage, leaving it to the states to provide assistance
for those toiling in these professions. See id. This provision was included in re-
sponse to the lobbying efforts of southern Congressmen. See id.
141. ABRAMOVITZ, supra note 127, at 318-19 (quoting MARY S. LARABEE, UN-
MARRIED PARENTHOOD UNDER THE SOCIAL SECURITY ACT, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE
NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF SOCIAL WORK 447-49 (1939)).
[Vol. 44: p. 445
32
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 44, Iss. 3 [1999], Art. 7
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol44/iss3/7
THE BURDENS OF BENEFITS
From the very start, there were burdens associated with ADC's welfare
benefits. They fell on three distinct groups. First, there was stigma and a
continued lack of assistance for the non-core cases who did not make it-
the blacks who were denied benefits lest they go out and "have more chil-
dren.1 42 Second, there were incentives for the qualified non-core
Cinderellas to stay at home and on welfare, rather than to work., 4 3 Third,
there were burdens of a fiscal sort on the core cases who thought of them-
selves as paying for ADC through their taxes. 144
In the humble, limited beginnings of ADC these burdens were not
much noticed-or, better put, were not considered net burdens at all.
The first burden was, after all, part of the point-ADC's benefits were
never meant to extend to the outer regions of the non-core model. 1 45 So,
too, the second incentive, which would be a "perverse" one in modern
lights-a "poverty trap"-was also part of the point of ADC. The plan was
precisely to keep qualified non-core mothers at home until their Prince
Charmings came along, as the above passages indicate.1 46 Finally, the
costs to the core were considered acceptable because the core was making
an investment; it was spending its money now to keep certain promising
non-core children out of delinquency and to prepare them for future con-
tributions to core society.1
47
As the system grew and became a more transparent burden on the
core this would all change, in part because the core was compelled to ex-
tend the largesse more broadly than it had hoped in order to address the
first burden. 1 48 At that point, the incentives to the qualified non-core-
142. See Williams, supra note 12, at 722 (noting problem with lack of assist-
ance to non-core cases).
143. See AmRAMOVITZ, supra note 127, at 315-18 (stating that early welfare pro-
grams accepted and perpetuated ideology that women should mother in home
while men should labor in market); GORDON, supra note 127, at 135-36 (same).
144. See, e.g., Goldberg v. Kelly 397 U.S. 254 (1970) (discussing state's asserted
interest in limiting costs and burdens placed on taxpayers in support of redistribu-
tive welfare programs). In Goldberg, the state argued that it had a compelling inter-
est in removing unqualified recipients from the welfare rolls because of the costs
such a program imposes upon the core families. See id. at 258.
145. See Williams, supra note 12, at 722 (discussing lack of assistance to non-
core cases).
146. See Joel F. Handler, Ending Welfare as We Know It-Wrong for We4fare,
Wrong for Poverty, 2 GEO. J. ON FIGHTING POVERTY 3, 4 (1994) (discussing how aid
was distributed to mothers deemed "fit and proper" in order to enable worthy
women to stay home and raise children and provide stable home environment).
Handler explains that the welfare program was structured so that "poor mothers of
young children could stay at home." Id. at 4. "Morally, excused from work, they
now became the 'deserving' poor and were no longer in conflict with the domestic
code." Id.
147. See Jill Duerr Berrick, From Mother's Duty to Personal Responsibility: The
Evolution of AFDC, 7 HASTINGS WOMEN'S L.J. 259, 271 (1996) (discussing justifica-
tion for aid to single mothers that suggested it was unhealthy for children if
mother was forced out of home and into workplace by economic hardship).
148. See GWENDOLYN MINK, THE WAGES OF MOTHERHOOD: INEQUALITY IN THE
WELFARE STATE, 1917-1942 182 (1995) (noting demographics of ADC recipients
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the second burden-got noticed and labeled perverse, so that the ultimate
retrenchment of welfare could be described as for "their" own good. 149
This just so happened, as it turned out, to alleviate the third burden-the
cost to the core.
2. Growth-and Retrenchment
The big problem, from the perspective of those who resisted the
welfarist spirit of ADC, was that nothing really improved. The Great De-
pression came and went, and so did World War II. But times proved that
single parent, female-headed-and poor-households were here to stay.
Over time, ADC grew. In 1940, ADC covered 372,000 families at a cost of
133 million dollars; by 1960, the numbers had risen to 803,000 and a cost
of 994 million dollars. 150
At the dawn of the 1960s, the sheer magnitude of the ADC program
fueled a rethinking and reconception.' 5' The program's very size had be-
gun to overwhelm the bureaucratic administration that had always been
central to the de facto limitation of the program's reach and cost.152 At
the same time and in addition, a growing civil rights movement spread to
the courts and legal aid, making it hard to continue to monitor and curtail
ADC through discretionary, normative provisions.' 53 ADC began increas-
had changed radically: non white recipients rose from 14% of rolls up to 46% by
1967); Sonya Michel, A Tale of Two States: Race, Gender, and Public/Private Welfare
Provisions in Post-War America, 9 YALEJ.L. & FEMINISM 123, 129 (1997) (noting that
precipitants of welfare reform were expansion of public assistance and changes in
racial composition of welfare recipients).
149. See, e.g., Public Welfare Amendments of 1962: Hearings Before the House Comm.
On Ways and Means, 87th Congress 63 (1962) (paraphrasing Abraham Ribicoff).
Testifying in favor of altering the ADC program to include incentives to work,
Abraham Ribicoff- President Kennedy's Secretary of Health, Education and Wel-
fare-indicated that work requirements served the best interests of welfare recipi-
ents. See id. Ribicoff argued that self-sufficiency and rehabilitation should become
paramount objectives of the welfare program, not just simple relief. See id.
150. See ABRAMOVITZ, supra note 127, at 319 (noting families and cost in
dollars).
151. See Michel, supra note 148, at 129 (detailing explosion in size of ADC
program). In 1940, there were 1.2 million ADC recipients. See id. By 1960, that
number grew to 3.1 million. See id. Likewise, the costs of the program skyrock-
eted. In 1940, the program cost $133 million. See id. By 1960, the cost increased
sevenfold to $994 million. See id. (citing U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH, EDUCATION AND
WELFARE, SOCIAL SECURITY PROGRAMS IN THE UNITED STATES 96 (1968)).
152. See Joel F. Handler, The Transformation of Aid to Families with Dependent
Children: The Family Support Act in Historical Context, 16 N.Y.U. REv. L. & Soc.
CHANGE 457, 480 (1987-88) ("AFDC became massive and appeared out of control.
It was popularly referred to as an 'administrative nightmare.'"). The rising size
and cost of the program attracted popular attention and thrust reform to the fore-
front. See id.
153. See Silvia M. Menendez, AFDC Beneficiaries and the Automobile Equity Limit,
12 LAw & INEQ. J. 529, 532 (1993) ("Court forced expansion of the pool of eligible
recipients, together with the inclusion of previously excluded groups steadily in-
creased the bureaucracy associated with AFDC."). For example, in 1968 the
Supreme Court invalidated the "man in the house" restriction that denied benefits
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ingly to cover nonwhite families. Whereas welfare families had once been
86% white, the percentage had fallen to 54% by 1967.154 No longer could
the program be sold to members of the core as a temporary, minor, cost-
effective one designed to bring sympathetic Cinderella stories back into
the core. Welfare had become a form of "redistribution," of the govern-
ment playing "Robin Hood"; it had become a net transfer from the core to
the non-core, shorn of its consequentialist aspirations. From the perspec-
tive of the Ozzie-and-Harriet style family, it was time for a change. It came.
Almost right from its inception in 1935, the story of ADC was a simul-
taneous story of growth and retrenchment. The growth came as a brute
fact of the matter, as caseloads swelled under the weight of demographic
changes and legal and bureaucratic pressure on what one author has
called the policy of "regulation by exclusion." 155 Retrenchment came at
the same time as the core fought back. Legal and regulatory changes at-
tempting to stem the swelling tide of welfare were common throughout
the post-war period. 15 6 They reached something of a high point in 1962,
when ADC was reborn as Aid to Families with Dependent Children
(AFDC) .157 Later changes were made in 1967 that attempted to stem the
growth of children born out of wedlock, and on and on throughout the
1970s and 1980s. 1
5 8
This story of simultaneous growth and retrenchment has been well
told, by Linda Gordon, Mimi Abramovitz and many others-most recently
by Tonya Brito in this volume. 15 9 I will not repeat this large, important
and generally sad story here. Rather, I mean to set the story of the welfare
benefits program, aimed at non-core cases, in the context of this Article's
primary themes. In welfare, we see a small program designed to benefit
certain sympathetic non-core cases. But as it grew, its burdens on the core
became more salient and objectionable. This is precisely the opposite of
the dynamic sketched in the case studies of Part II. There, small benefits
programs were designed to benefit the core. As those programs grew,
if the mother was co-habitating with a man inside or outside the house. See King v.
Smith, 392 U.S. 309, 319 (1968). This, of course, increased the number of quali-
fied recipients.
154. See Gwendolyn Mink, Welfare Reform in Historical Perspective, 26 CONN. L.
REv. 879, 891 (1994) (discussing political backlash caused by clash of "liberalism"
and "racism" as number of non white, ADC recipients continued to grow at explo-
sive rates).
155. ABRAMOVTTZ, supra note 127, at 318.
156. See id. (discussing changes in regulatory schemes).
157. See The Public Welfare Amendments of 1962, Pub. L. No. 97-543, 76 Stat.
185 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.); see also ABRAMOVITZ,
supra note 130, at 318 (discussing change from ADC to ADFC); MINK, supra note
151, at 880 (discussing policy changes encompassed by enactment of AFDC: wel-
fare was expanded, barriers to eligibility were removed and moral supervision was
relaxed).
158. See Social Security Amendments of 1967, Pub. L. No. 90-248, 81 Stat. 821.
159. See generally ABRAMOVITZ, supra note 127 (discussing simultaneous growth
and retrenchment); GORDON, supra note 127 (same); Brito, supra note 13 (same).
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their status as "benefits" became less salient and objectionable, and the
burdens on the non-core continued to be ignored.
By the 1960s, the idea or hope that there was a manageable number
of non-core cases, brought on by trying times and that could assimilate
into the core, was no longer realistic. Core society had come to see that
female-headed households of all races and sorts were here to stay and had
lost its ability to pick and choose the potential Cinderella stories among
them. Rather than continue trying to assimilate all cases into the core and
perhaps even expand the reach of ADC to other, non-core cases, welfare
reform went in a different direction. Society tried to write off all non-core
cases as permanently outside the core, Ozzie-and-Harriet style ideal. Soci-
ety reconcieved single-parent households of all races as somehow unde-
serving of largesse. The pivotal 1962 changes introduced the concept of
work incentives into welfare and planted the seeds for the ultimate dis-
mantlement of the program and its rebirth as "workfare."'1 60 The hope
was that single-parent households-even if they were doomed to stay sin-
gle-parent households-could at least stop burdening the state. Cinder-
ella was told to go to work. As the program had grown more expensive
and burdensome on the core, it laid the foundation for a reconception of
the non-core paradigm, such that the custodial single mother could now
be expected-even required-to share part of the load.
Of course, as most of us know by now, the reforms of the 1960s, 1970s
and 1980s did not succeed in curbing the growth of welfare. The program
continued to grow, just as social security did. The move from ADC to
AFDC did, however, successfully shift the focus of welfare from children to
the mothers who bore and supported them. Society found it easier to
blame these adults and to cut them loose; the non-core cases could be
spun off and relegated to the netherworld. All the while, consequentialist
talk abounded. Initially, the idea of ADC was to help tide over the select
non-core, in the hope that they would not remain non-core-that they
would one day "contribute" back to society. As the program swelled and
started to include more and more cases that looked solidly non-core, the
focus continued to be on how to make "them" "productive. '1 6 1 Welfare
has never been seen in this country as a matter of entitlement or right in a
thick sense-as part of what a fair and decent society owes, at a minimum,
to all of its members. Instead, it is viewed as a matter of economics and
dollars and cents-what "bang for the buck" we get.
Perhaps this cost-effective focus sounds logical-or fair or efficient or
even "neutral"-to some. Yet it marks a striking contrast with the benefits
programs given to one-earner families under the social security and in-
160. See GORDON, supra note 127, at 10-11 (indicating that claims to welfare
have been justified on wage earning, or return for service, basis).
161. SeeJonathan Barry Forman, Improving the Earned Income Credit: Transition
to a Wage Subsidy for the Working Poor, 16 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 41, 43-44 (1988) (noting
that few poverty geared programs are designed to help working poor and arguing
that such help is appropriate).
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come tax systems. There, as we .have seen, society gave large bonuses to
wealthy one-earner families. In those cases, we don't ask what "bang for
the buck" we get; we don't consider whether or not the funds transferred
to Ozzie and Harriet help make such families more likely, more stable or
more productive. If we did ask those questions, we would be forced to
confront more openly an apparent absurdity. Why are we trying to reward
and encourage wealthy one-earner families, who constitute an increasingly
small percentage of our people, and who do not obviously seem to need
any help? Instead, we talk of consequences and investments among the
poor; rights and neutral policies among the rich-a social logic that a dis-
passionate outside observer, concerned only with social justice, might well
think precisely backwards.
By the 1990s, a full-scale attack on welfare recipients in the form of a
pattern of blaming the beneficiaries took hold. President Clinton, a Dem-
ocrat, vowed to "end welfare as we know it."1 6 2 Unlike other vows, Clinton
stuck to and acted on this one. The significantly named Personal Respon-
sibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996163 abolished
AFDC. In its place came a new acronym, befitting a seriously curtailed
federal commitment to welfare: Temporary Aid to Needy Families,
TANF.164 At the exact same time that the significant bonuses to Ozzie-
and-Harriet style families were being ensconced in the tax and social se-
curity systems, welfare "reform" was making it abundantly clear that aid to
the non-core cases would never be assimilated into the status quo.
165
B. Earned-Income Tax Credit
1. Humble Beginnings
The earned-income tax credit (EITC) story, for the most part, simply
continues the story of welfare. The EITC was first put in place in 1975, a
time of relative political moderation with Gerald Ford as president and the
Congress in Democratic hands. It was also a period of economic hard
times. 166 Senator Russell B. Long of Louisiana, Chairman of the Senate
162. See Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of
1996, Pub. L. No. 104-193, 110 Stat. 2105 (codified as amended in scattered sec-
tions of 42 U.S.C.).
163. See id.
164. See id. (explaining nature of program funded by federal grants to states).
165. For a further discussion of these systems, see supra notes 23-122 and ac-
companying text.
166. See Michael J. Caballero, The Earned Income Tax Credit: The Poverty Program
That Is Too Popular, 48 TAx LAw. 435, 438 (1995) (noting that earned income tax
credit was enacted during "time of economic struggle"); see also Anne L. Alstott,
The Earned Income Tax Credit and the Limitations of Tax-Based Welfare Reform, 108
HAxv. L. REv. 533, 533 (1995) (arguing that earned income tax credit plays key
role in social welfare policy); Forman, supra note 161, at 50 (stating that earned
income tax credit was designed to stimulate stagnating economy).
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Finance Committee, championed the idea for the EITC. 1 6 7 This was
ironic, given the late Huey Long's role in supporting the initial welfare
program in 1935.163 The EITC has always been linked, in fact if not in
theory, with the war against welfare; it has been a key component in mak-
ing the move from "welfare to workfare." 1 69 The very rise of the EITC has
been a large part of the fall of AFDC.
The initial motivation behind the EITC was to eliminate some of the
work disincentives facing poor households with children. 170 This contin-
ued a theme of welfare reform found in the 1950s and 1960s that had led
to the change from ADC to AFDC; once again, burdens on the intended
beneficiaries get noticed only when they happen to coincide with burdens
on the core. But the benefits structure of the EITC was also connected to
the tax structure of social security, a system growing in importance
throughout the whole period and one that made no accommodation for
family size, need or anything else. Unlike the income tax, which has al-
ways had a range of income immune from tax, social security "contribu-
tions" are due on the very first dollar of earned income.' 7 1 We can readily
understand the EITC as creating a "zero bracket" under social security for
lower-income households, as its framers in fact intended. 1 72
It is therefore not obvious-and it is far from "neutral"-to conclude
that the EITC, as initially enacted, was really a "benefits" program at all, as
opposed to relief from the burden of the regressive social security contri-
bution system. The social security system was growing ever larger during
the 1950s and 1960s, in part to help subsidize Ozzie-and-Harriet style fami-
lies. Prior to the EITC, workers earning minimum-wage levels were actu-
ally paying a tax in part to help pay for wealthy, non-working Harriets. Of
course, we have never quite brought ourselves to think of the EITC that
167. See Caballero, supra note 166, at 438 (noting that Long wanted to "'re-
ward work and parents supporting their children"').
168. See GoRDON, supra note 127, at 229-30 (noting that Long's proposed wel-
fare program was based upon statistics that were either "extremely outmoded or
fabricated," was called Share Our Wealth and included such promises as employ-
ment for "'every American man'").
169. See Alstott, supra note 166, at 534 (noting that proponents of earned in-
come tax credit claim it "promotes work and family responsibility among the poor,
unlike traditional welfare programs").
170. See Forman, supra note 161, at 44 (indicating that earned income tax
credit is federal program "geared to help the working poor"). But see Alstott, supra
note 166, at 534 (contending that earned income tax credit advocates "exaggerate
the program's effectiveness in encouraging work").
171. See Caballero, supra note 166, at 435 n.1 (providing rate at which social
security taxes are imposed on wages and noting that Internal Revenue Code pro-
vides for no personal exemptions or standard deductions as with federal income
tax).
172. See Forman, supra note 161, at 51 (stating that proposed earned income
tax credit used income tax system to alleviate impact of social security taxes on low-
income individuals and families).
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way. In any event, the initial program was passed with wide and bi-partisan
support.1 73
Like the pattern of marriage bonuses and penalties discussed above,
the EITC works through the tax system. It is a "refundable credit."174 A
credit is a straight dollar transfer from the government to the taxpayer.
This differs from a deduction, which subtracts from taxable income and
thus saves a taxpayer at her marginal tax rate-meaning that deductions
are worth more to higher bracket taxpayers. 175 Credits, in contrast, are
worth the same at any marginal rate bracket. Most credits in the tax law
are "non-refundable," meaning that they can reduce a taxpayer's total tax
owed to zero but not below. 176 The refundability of the EITC means, in
contrast, that this particular credit can indeed bring a family's tax below
zero-the government will actually mail some families a check or find
some other way to get money into their hands.'
77
When the EITC began in 1975, the credit was set at 10% of a tax-
payer's earned income up to $4,000-a maximum credit of $400.178 To
qualify, one had to have at least one dependent child at home. 179 The
credit was then "phased out," again at a 10% rate, beginning at the first
173. See Alstott, supra note 166, at 537 (stating that earned income tax credit
has found "secure niche" in welfare approach by responding to strong theme of
"bipartisan consensus on work-based welfare reform"); see also Caballero, supra
note 166, at 436 (providing reasons for both conservative and liberal support of
earned income tax credit).
174. See Forman, supra note 161, at 44 (noting that earned income tax credit
is refundable and explaining that if credit amount exceeds income tax liability,
Treasury will refund balance); see also I.R.C. § 6401(b) (1998) (explaining refund-
ability of credit).
175. See JAMES J. FREELAND ET AL., FUNDAMENTALS OF FEDERAL INCOME TAxA-
TION 957 (David L. Shapiro et al., eds., 10th ed. 1998) (explaining that credit is
better than deduction for taxpayer because it "reduces tax liability dollar-for-dol-
lar, whereas a deduction reduces only taxable income with a corresponding but
smaller reduction in tax liability"). Deductions create increased tax savings for
taxpayers in higher tax brackets, but credits create the same tax savings for all
taxpayers. See id.
176. See id. (explaining that even if nonrefundable tax credit exceeds com-
puted tax, taxpayer receives no refund). The four groups of nonrefundable tax
credits are personal credits, general business credits, certain miscellaneous credits
and the minimum tax credit. See id.
177. See I.R.C. §§ 32(g), 3507 (1998) (providing that in receiving earned in-
come tax credit, eligible family may receive advanced payment of expected credit,
rather than waiting for refund); see also FREELAND, supra note 175, at 967 (explain-
ing interaction of two sections).
178. See Alstott, supra note 166, at 537 (providing analysis of earned income
tax credit's growth from enactment in 1975 to 1996).
179. See Caballero, supra note 166, at 440 (indicating that requirement in
1975 of at least one dependent child was effort to "target benefits" and stating that
this requirement effectively excluded young and old taxpayers whose income levels
often fell within EITC range). But see I.R.C. § 32(c) (1) (A) (1998) (indicating that
individuals may now be eligible for EITC without dependent child).
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dollar earned in excess of $4,000.1s ° The "phaseout" meant that a family
would have to "pay back" its EITC benefit as it ascended into the lower-
middle class. So a family that made $5,000, for example, would get a
credit of $400 on its first $4,000 of earned income but would then lose the
credit at the rate of 10% of its next $1,000 of income-the income that
moved the family from $4,000 to $5,000-for a reduction of $100 and a
net credit of $300.11 By the time a family reached $8,000, the credit was
gone.18 2
This phaseout combined with other restrictions kept the initial cost of
the EITC within humble bounds. Congress went even further in limiting
the EITC by making it temporary-it was only to apply to the calendar
year 1975.183 The revenue cost was estimated at a relatively modest 1.5
billion dollars.1 4 This was a classic humble beginning for a benefits
program.
The EITC's placement within the income tax laws has always given it
both advantages and disadvantages.18 5 One advantage is that the EITC
doesn't require a separate bureaucracy to watch over it. But the complex-
ity of the income tax law has also deterred many legitimate beneficiaries
from claiming the credit, which also does not extend to those who fail to
file altogether, for whatever reason. 18 6 The EITC's structure as an income
tax provision has also made its connection to social security taxes less visi-
ble. Rather than seeing it as a "zero bracket" under the increasingly im-
portant social security tax system-arguably a more "neutral"
characterization-critics have seen the EITC as a special provision, an act
of largesse, under the income tax system.
Aside from its burdens on the fisc, many of which are actually born by
the near-poor under the phaseout tax, there are two large burdens under
the EITC. The first is a marriage penalty brought on by the fact that the
180. See Caballero, supra note 166, at 439-40 (explaining "phaseout" reduc-
tion of 1975 version of EITC); see also I.R.C. § 32(b) (1998) (providing current
credit percentages and amount and phaseout percentage and amount for three
types of eligible individuals).
181. See FREELAND, supra note 175, at 966. It may be important to note that
the phaseout procedure depends on the greater of the eligible individual's earned
income or modified adjusted gross income. See id.
182. See I.R.C. § 32(b) (setting forth phaseout amount and percentages for
eligible individuals). These amounts have, of course, changed since 1975.
183. See Caballero, supra note 166, at 441 (noting that EITC was enacted on
temporary basis but later extended to cover future tax years).
184. See id.
185. See Alstott, supra note 166, at 535 (arguing that advantages of EITC's
inclusion in tax law are lower cost and less social stigmatization than traditional
welfare, but disadvantages include "significant institutional contraints").
186. See Caballero, supra note 166, at 461 (noting that taxpayers whose in-
come is less than available standard deduction and personal exemptions are not
required to file, are likely to be those people most in need of EITC and are likely
to be unaware of EITC because of not filing).
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credit has never made any provision for marriage or joint filing.' 8 7 If Oz-
zie alone earned $4,000 in 1975, his family would qualify for the full $400
credit. But if Ozzie and Harriet each worked for $4,000, their family
would get nothing at all. Yet again, we see that two-earner households are
punished, even among the poor, and even at a time when they form the
vast majority of two-parent households..8 8
The second burden created under the EITC is the work disincentive
brought about because of the "phaseout" range. This phaseout, combined
with both the lowest income tax bracket and social security contributions,
initially meant that lower-middle class workers could face marginal tax
rates of 33% and higher.18 9 Today, with a phaseout in excess of 20%, the
number can easily approach 50%.190 It is worth pausing and noting that
phaseouts are neither necessary nor obviously justified. They stem from
the idea that the near poor should pay back the benefits of the poor; that
is, that the core should be kept out of this as much as possible. If we
eliminated the phaseout, tax rates would increase across the spectrum to
pay for the relief given to the working poor. Why shouldn't this be the
case? If we view the EITC as some relief from the tax and other costs of
the working poor, it is not at all obvious why it should be "paid back" by
the near poor. If, in contrast, we view it as a matter of largesse, the
"payback" rationale becomes more compelling. This latter frame is, of
course, consonant with the psychological perspective and self-interest of
the wealthy core.
187. See McCAFFERY, supra note 4, at 81-84 (noting that some current bills,
which have not garnered much support as of this writing, have been introduced to
alleviate this problem).
188. See U.S. Bureau of the Census, Current Population Reports 20-515,
Household and Family Characteristics: March 1998 (Update) (visited Mar. 9, 1999)
(last modified Feb. 22, 1999) <http://www.census.gov/population/socdemo/hh-
fam/htabMC-l.txt>. (providing statistical data connecting two-earner to two-parent
households). In fact, in 1998, 56% of all the married couples in the United States
have both the husband and the wife in the workforce. See id. That figure rises to
62% for all couples with children under the age of six and 68% for all married
couples with children under the age of 18. See id.
189. See I.R.C. § 32(b) (1998) (eligible individual with two or more qualifying
children qualifies for maximum EITC equal to 40% of $8,890). For example, con-
sider a one-income family earning $12,000 per year and qualifying for the maxi-
mum EITC. Such a family is subject to a 15% income tax rate and pays 7.65% in
social security taxes. As noted in the text, the maximum amount of EITC that any
ualifying taxpayer can receive is $3,556. When the taxpayer earnings exceed
11,610, the EITC is slowly phased out at an initial rate of 21.06% of total income.
See id. Because the family earned more than the threshold amount, they are disal-
lowed $2,527 (21.06% of $12,000) of EITC.
In total, the family's marginal tax rate is the sum of their federal tax, their
social security tax and the amount of EITC to which they no longer qualify (15% +
7.65% + 21.06% = 43.71%). Without considering additional amounts which would
be owed in local or state taxes, the lower family is paying an effective tax rate of
43.71%.
190. For families in the lowest tax brackets, the effective tax rate can easily
approach 50% when state and local taxes are included in the equation.
1999]
41
McCaffery: The Burdens of Benefits
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1999
VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW
As with each of the benefit programs we have examined, the initial
EITC was small and its burdens were not much noticed. Once again time
would change both facts.
2. Growth-and Retrenchment?
The EITC proved popular. Congress renewed it to cover the tax years
1976 and 1977.191 In 1978, the credit was made permanent and its size
was extended, to cover 10% of the first $5,000 of income. 192 The law also
introduced a "plateau," or a range in which neither a credit nor a
phaseout applied-a feature of the EITC that persists to this day.193 Thus,
a qualifying family would get a credit of 10% of its first $5,000 of income;
nothing would happen for its next $1,000; and the family would enter a
phaseout range starting at $6,000, when they would lose the credit at a
12.5% rate.194 Procedural changes were also introduced in 1978 allowing
taxpayers to get their credit ratably over time, through a system of "nega-
tive withholding" in paychecks. 195
More changes-involving both expansion and restructuring-oc-
curred in 1984, 1986 and 1990.196 By far the greatest expansion of the
EITC came in 1993 under the Clinton Administration.1 9 7 At the same
time that the Administration was sponsoring a potentially regressive en-
191. See Tax Reform Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-455, 90 Stat. 1520, 1556-1558
(amending tax code relating to Earned Income Tax Credit and changing expira-
tion date of January 1, 1977 to January 1, 1978).
192. See Revenue Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-600, § 104(f), 92 Stat. 2763, 2773(amending tax code related to Earned Income Tax Credit, eliminating language
referring to expiration date, allowing for maximum EITC of $500 instead of $400);
see generally Caballero, supra note 166, at 441-44 (discussing legislative development
of Earned Income Tax Credit and elimination of expiration date from statutory
scheme).
193. See Caballero, supra note 166, at 442 (noting that phaseout "plateau was
introduced, from $5000 to $6000, where the credit remained constant even
though income increased").
194. See id. (noting that after $6000 plateau, EITC phased out at rate of 12.5%
of adjusted gross income and credit eliminated completely when household in-
comes reached $10,000).
195. See id. (noting that EITC was amended to permit taxpayer to receive
EITC payments throughout tax year rather than wait for refund); Forman, supra
note 161, at 54 (noting that Revenue Act of 1978 permitted employees to "elect to
have advance payments of the earned income credit added to their paychecks each
pay period through the normal withholding mechanism").
196. See generally Caballero, supra note 166, at 443-46 nn.52-83 and accompa-
nying text (discussing legislative evolution of EITC as result of 1984 through 1990
legislative amendments). Among other things, the 1984 amendment increased the
EITC to $550 and changed the phaseout rate to 12-2/9% with a complete
phaseout at $11,000. See id. at 443. The 1986 amendment changed the phaseout
rate to 14% and permitted a maximum EITC of $800. See id. at 444. The 1990
amendments made allowances for qualifying dependents, with a maximum EITC
of $1,511 for taxpayers with two or more qualifying dependants. See id. at 445.
197. See id. at 451 (noting that Clinton administration sought to increase max-
imum EITC from 19.5% to 31.59%, from maximum EITC of $1,511 to $3,371 for
total increase of 123%).
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ergy or Btu tax, and in the midst of an economic recession, it advocated
EITC expansion estimated to cost twenty-eight billion dollars over five
years.19 8 Once again, it is a matter of historical record that part of the
point of the EITC was simply to offset other, regressive, taxes, so that our
very poorest working citizens might face an actual, effective tax rate of
zero.' 99 But this characterization has been quickly forgotten.
The ultimate proposal enacted in 1993 was somewhat more modest,
but the EITC had still become very large indeed. 20 0 As it now stands, a
family with two or more qualifying dependents gets a credit of 40% of its
first $8,890, indexed for inflation, for a potential credit of $3,556.201
Meanwhile, the phaseout range and amount also increased, to a 21.06%
rate starting at $11,610.2o2 The EITC had almost overnight become the
major federal assistance program, costing $28.8 billion by 1996.203
In and of itself, this might have been good for the cause of greater
justice among the poor, but the expansion of the EITC went hand-in-hand
with the dismantlement of AFDC, discussed in the prior section. Thus the
EITC, originally meant as relief from one regressive tax system and ex-
panded to include relief from another, soon became the dominant "enti-
tlement" program in America and a reason for dismantling welfare.
20 4 Of
course, the EITC is conditioned on work and, indeed, on filling out tax
forms. 20
5
198. See id. at 448 (noting that Clinton administration introduced broad-
based Btu energy tax to raise revenue to reduce budget deficit; changes sought to
EITC were intended to offset perceived regressive impact of Btu tax on poor; and
estimated cost of revised EITC program would have been $28.3 billion).
199. See generally Forman, supra note 161, at 45-47 (discussing origin of EITC
and tracing development as result of President Lyndon B. Johnson's "War on
Poverty").
200. See Caballero, supra note 166, at 456 (noting that Revenue Reconciliation
Act of 1993 contained most of increased benefits in original Administration propo-
sal, but total amount of revenue expended under program was projected to be
$20.8 billion over 5 years versus Administration's original proposal of $28.5 billion
over 5 years).
201. See I.R.C. § 32(b) (1) (A) (1998) (indicating that EITC percentage is 40%
for eligible individual with 2 or more qualifying children where earned income
amount is $8,890).
202. See id. § 32(b) (indicating that EITC phaseout rate for eligible individual
with 2 or more qualifying children is 21.06% and that phaseout amount is
$11,610).
203. See White House Office of Management and Budget, Fiscal 2000 Budget
Part V, Chapter 4-Supporting Working Families, TAX NOTES TODAY (Feb. 2, 1999)
(announcing officially that under Clinton Administration's new budget "[t]he
EITC will provide $167 billion of tax benefits over the next five years to low-income
working families"); see also George K. Yin et al., Improving the Delivery of Benefits to the
Working Poor: Proposals to Reform the Earned Tax Income Credit Program, TAX NoTEs
TODAY, (Mar. 3, 1994) (estimating that annual cost of EITC would be almost $25
billion by 1998).
204. See generally Forman, supra note 161, at 46 (noting that EITC developed
out of concern in early 1960s regarding economic welfare of poor Americans).
205. See RobertJ. Barro, Workfare Still Beats Welfare, WALL ST. J., May 21, 1996,
at A22 (noting that "the earned income tax credit ... actually helps the working
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At the same time that the EITC has expanded, its burdens have be-
come more severe. The marginal tax rate facing a worker earning as little
as $12,000 a year can now be perilously close to 50%, considering the
EITC phaseout of 21.06%, the income tax rate of 15%, social security taxes
of 7.65% and state and local taxes of various sorts. The brute social facts
can be shocking when set in a comparative context. For example, a mar-
ried couple must have taxable income over $250,000 to be in a marginal
income tax bracket higher than a single mother earning $12,000.206
The story of marriage penalties under the EITC is similar in both its
magnitude and in the general social quiescence about it. Today, lower-
income, two-earner, married couples face extremely high marriage penal-
ties. By 1994, a two-earner family where each spouse earned $10,000-
roughly $200 a week, approximately minimum wage-would pay a mar-
riage penalty of over $3,700, nearly one-fourth of their pre-tax income. 20 7
In contrast, a couple where each spouse earned $25,000 would pay a mar-
riage penalty of only $727, one-fifth of what their poorer fellow citizens
paid.208 The reason for this extreme disparity is that the EITC has contin-
ued to make no accommodation for marriage. It thus has a penalty struc-
ture akin to whatjoint filing at the singles tax rate would have-an option
that America roundly rejected in 1941.209
In practical and moral terms, the EITC's marriage penalty is perverse.
Because society constructed a system on the assumption that it would ap-
ply to single mothers, it actually discouraged such women from marrying.
At the same time that core society continued to exalt and reward Ozzie-
and-Harriet style families at the top of the income scale, it made two-par-
ent families of any sort less likely among the lower reaches. It also laid the
poor in a way that promotes work and discourages welfare"). Of concern is the
fact that many in the lowest income bracket are not required to file any income tax
return and therefore, are unable to take advantage of the EITC program. See Ca-
ballero, supra note 166, at 461.
206. See I.R.C. § 1(a) (2) (1998) (stating that 39.6% bracket for married
couples begins at $250,000). Before that, commencing at $140,000, they are in the
36% bracket. The individual, in contrast, is in the 15% income tax bracket (I.R.C.
§ 1 (c)), and the earned income tax credit phaseout of 21.06% (I.R.C. § 32(b)(1)),
for a combined federal income tax marginal rate of 36.06%.
207. See Feenberg & Rosen, supra note 98, at 94, tbl.2 (indicating marriage
taxes of $3,717 for hypothetical couple having two children and where each spouse
earns $10,000). The marriage tax is based on key elements of the tax law which
depend on a family's situation: the applicable rate schedule, the standard deduc-
tion and the EITC. See id. at 92. For example, the standard deduction for a single
individual is $3,800, but the standard deduction for a couple filing jointly is $6,350.
See id. at 93. Based upon the standard deduction alone, the couple loses $1,250 of
the standard deduction which they would have realized if they had filed as single.
See id. This lost $1,250 is one element of the marriage tax. See id. at 92.
208. See id. at 94 tbl.2.
209. See McCAFFERY, supra note 4, at 49-52 (discussing mandatory joint filing
proposal developed by Congress in 1941 that was subsequently rejected due to
massive unpopularity). For a further discussion of the rejected 1941 mandatory
joint filing proposal, see supra notes 73-78 and accompanying text.
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groundwork for social conservatives to criticize continued aid to the poor
on the grounds that "their" unstable family structures showed that "they"
were immoral-echoes of the "worthy" and "suitable home" provisos in
the original ADC program.
As the burdens of the EITC to the non-core cases it was meant to
serve grew-we can understand the problems as being poverty and mar-
riage "traps" deterring accession to the middle class-scholars and others
began focusing on the disincentives in explicitly consequentialist logic.2 10
Did the EITC really deter work effort or marriage? By and large, the litera-
ture has been rather sanguine, finding that the actual effects of the EITC's
burdens are not terribly severe. 211 I happen to believe that there are good
reasons to be skeptical of these answers. Both persistent poverty and un-
stable family structures among the lower classes are over-determined social
phenomena. The marriage penalties among the working poor are enor-
mous, as we have seen. It doesn't particularly matter whether or not indi-
viduals or families understand these biases in crisp intellectual form-it is
a frequent mistake of defenders of the status quo to point to the complex-
ity of the EITC and other transfer programs as arguments against their
disincentive effects. Cognitive understanding of the law is not a prerequi-
site to its behavioral affects: what we do not know definitely can hurt us.
Standard models of the effects of welfare and workfare take a narrow
view. They typically look at the elasticity of marriage rates among the poor
across limited time periods and on either side of incremental changes in
the tax and transfer systems. There is a far larger problem and context of
culture. The narrow view, conveniently enough, fails to take into account
the ways in which a dominant culture-the core-shapes the realities and
possibilities of a nondominant culture-the non-core.
The stories of welfare and workfare reform and their analysis illus-
trates this point. Marriage among the poor has not been supported by a
wider society-a society that only seems to pay attention to the poor when
they are a source of trouble and cost. Meanwhile, the EITC, welfare, and
other perhaps well-meaning programs only add additional injury via their
210. See, e.g., Robert Greenstein et al., Earned Income Credit Works, CBPP Finds,
TAX NoTEs TODAY, (Mar. 27, 1998) (noting that research indicates EITC increases
work efforts among single mothers, and moderates gap between wealthy and work-
ing poor); see also Alstott, supra note 166, at 534-35 (discussing views of EITC work
incentives held by proponents and opponents of EITC and criticizing both be-
cause work incentive debate is too narrowly framed); Robert Moffitt, Incentive Ef-
fects of the U.S. Welfare System: A Review, 30J. ECON. LITERATURE 1, 16, 30-31 (1992)
(noting that economic evidence tends to indicate that welfare programs increase
number of single parent households and cause reductions in employment but that
estimates of effect vary considerably and are difficult to explain); TimothyJ. Eifler,
Comment, The Earned Income Tax Credit As a Tax Expenditure: An Alternative to Tradi-
tional Welfare Reform, 28 U. RICH. L. REv. 701, 714 n.56 (1994) (discussing disagree-
ment among scholars regarding work incentive aspect of EITC).
211. See, e.g., Greenstein, supra note 210 (noting that research found that
EITC increases employment rates of single mothers from 72.7% in 1984 to 82.1%
in 1996).
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marriage penalties. Whether or not working poor two-earner families
know it, they are losing thousands of dollars that they can ill afford. This
puts stress on the family and may lead to its breakup or nonformation. At
the same time, a potentially solid two-earner, two-parent family notices
that there are few other families around following its model. They might
even notice that the "best" families are especially likely to have a stay-at-
home parent, a Harriet. They are trying to make do, and it is not working.
Social norms and expectations break down. Meantime, core society comes
to take unstable family structures among the poor for granted. It contin-
ues to set up benefits programs with single-parent households in mind. It
doesn't even notice the marriage penalties at first. As the programs grow
and the penalties become very large it can no longer ignore them. At this
point, liberal defenders of the benefits programs are drawn to argue that
the disincentive effects are not severe, as a way of fighting off a socially
conservative movement to abandon the poor altogether, precisely because
of their lack of work effort and stable family structures.
There is thus good reason to question the answers given to the ques-
tion of behavior and incentive effects. But more to the point, there is
reason to question the questions themselves. Why are we asking conse-
quentialist questions about benefits programs for the non-core cases?
Among the poor, and the poor alone, society continues to expect a "bang
for our buck." We cannot bring ourselves to view what we are doing as
merely compensating for regressive economic policies elsewhere; much
less can we come to see aid to the poor as part of a basic system of demo-
cratic decency, an entitlement to the minimal prerequisites of a decent
existence.
Most strikingly, we do not ask these questions in the core model cases.
There, marriage bonuses or rewards to one-earner families are not meant
to be measured by their results. They are indeed matters of right or enti-
tlement. In parallel fashion, we ought to be asking the question of
whether marriage bonuses effectively keep women like Harriet at home.
Of course, this question, if made explicit, would only serve to make more
transparent the burdens that those benefits confer-helping Harriet to
stay at home is the same thing as punishing her for trying to work-and
how out of step our major benefits programs have gotten with contempo-
rary times and mores. So we do not ask these questions, and we hope that
no one of any importance will notice.
It is too early to tell what will happen to the EITC over time. We are
still too close to the "death of welfare" as we had come to know it for there
to be a large-scale effort to dismantle EITC. There has indeed been talk of
reform, grumbling about costs, and attention to error rates-meant selec-
tively to refer to over, not under, inclusion. 212 This Article gives us much
212. See id. (discussing error rate and estimated budget costs of EITC). The
major criticism against the EITC is the high error rate reported by the IRS. See id.
Nevertheless, the error rate has dropped considerably from approximately 35% in
the 1980s to 20.7% in 1997. See id. Moreover, the 1997 study was based on 1994
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reason to be skeptical about the long-term fate of the EITC. The benefits
under social security and the marriage bonuses under the income tax
could grow over time and thereby become only more and more en-
trenched. But welfare was fated to march to a different drummer. As it
grew, its costs became more noticeable. Then, and only then, attention
was paid to its behavioral effects. These were next used as part of the
argument against it.
Today, thanks in ironic part to the EITC, we have killed welfare and
replaced it with workfare. This has made EITC the largest "entitlement"
program-the largest one that our public accounting conventions track,
that is-and thus put it on the hot seat. Armies of consequentialist schol-
ars and researchers are now beginning to descend on the program, and
their very questions pose a haunting paradox for the prospects of contin-
ued aid of some sort, any sort, to the poor. If, on the one hand, the
EITC's burdens do not affect work or marriage incentives, can it really be
that the benefits have positive effects? On the other hand, if the burdens
do bind, should we not discontinue the benefits for the good of the poor
themselves? Once we start looking hard enough at any benefits program,
and see that it inevitably poses burdens, can "tough love" or a "good swift
kick in the pants"-as our exclusive social policy for the poor-be far
behind?
C. Common Ground
Welfare and workfare share much in common. Both are seen as non-
neutral deviations from the expected way of doing things-self-sufficiency.
Both are seen as acts of social largesse. This need not obviously be so.
The EITC, in particular, can easily be seen as compensating for social se-
curity and other regressive tax systems. But because they are seen as non-
neutral, these benefits programs are vulnerable to change. They are con-
stantly measured out and evaluated in consequential terms. A politically
liberal welfarist norm would certainly support the idea of a basic entitle-
ment for all citizens. But not here, not now. Welfare has never been seen
in these terms. It is evaluated as if it were an investment that society were
making, and the payers expect results.
What is also common is that, in all these regards, welfare and
workfare are not like the benefits in the core model cases discussed above.
There, the benefits inured to the core and the burdens fell outside, and
both were ignored while they grew and grew.
rates and is therefore believed to overstate the current error rate of EITC returns.
See id. The EITC is also criticized for its growing cost to the economy. See id.
Despite this criticism, current projections show that the EITC is expected to grow
at a slower rate than the Gross Domestic Product. See id. These same studies also
indicate that the EITC is the slowest growing entitlement program currently avail-
able. See id. The Congressional Budget Office projects that the EITC will grow at a
rate of 2.5% through 2003 compared to 4.5% average nominal growth rate pro-
jected for the national economy. See id.
1999]
47
McCaffery: The Burdens of Benefits
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1999
VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW
IV. CONCLUSION: WHAT IS TO BE DONE?
Times today are good for the most fortunate of us-life is a fairy tale,
as they say. The wealthiest Americans are wealthier than ever by almost
any measure. This material flourishing has gone along with a general
complacency and even an aversion of sorts to social movements of yore,
like civil rights or feminism. We are living happily ever after-always the
last words in fairy tales-in a land we want never to change.
But these happy times abound largely at the top of our income lad-
der, in the castles where princes and their damsels dwell. The vast middle
classes labor outside the castle walls, facing the manifold stresses of a newly
emergent two-parent, two-worker family model with little in the way of an-
cient role models or sympathetic laws to guide them. These families do
not even exist in the fairy tales.
The poor, of course, have it worst of all. This has always been true,
rather by definition, but what is striking and sad about modern times is
that the poor are getting poorer while the rich are getting richer. The
opportunities for life to improve for Cinderella are getting fewer and
harder to come by. Poor families do exist in fairy tales, of course, but they
do not always make it to the "happily ever after" part.
Perhaps this is just the way things ought to, or have to, be. Perhaps a
free market system is the best of all possible worlds, and the inducements
of lavish luxury are needed to make the rich more productive in the best
interests of all. Perhaps the princes in their castles will turn out to be
benevolent in the end. The best thing that those unfortunate souls
outside the castle walls can learn to do, meanwhile, is to fend for them-
selves in the hope that through hard work, good morals and sound disci-
pline, they or some family member can climb the walls. The poor can
read the fairy tales and hope. Until that day, a rising tide must suffice to
lift all boats. That is the best we can do. In the language of modern social
policy, markets work, welfare does not.
But the analysis of this essay suggests that this account is simply an-
other fairy tale. The fortunate few in their castles have not gotten there by
dint of their own hard work and industry alone. Instead, they have
benefitted at many turns from a socio-economic system that they or people
like them set up, with their cases in mind. These benefits to the core cases
create burdens for the non-core ones, yet we notice neither. The tables
turn, perfectly, completely, only when we look to the poor. Their benefits,
such as they are, are constantly scrutinized, and the burdens that they im-
pose on the core are constantly noticed.
It is almost certainly too much to ask that we throw open the doors to
the castle and let all in, showing a much greater solicitude for our neediest
brothers and sisters, that we realign our policies to make them signifi-
cantly more redistributive. Maybe, in the end, that isn't even the right way
to go. But we can at least be honest. Today benefits and burdens abound.
But the benefits that benefit the core cases rarely get noticed and are gen-
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erally entrenched, while the ones that benefit non-core cases are con-
stantly noticed and are constantly at risk. That is wrong-it is inconsistent,
unfair and hypocritical-and it should stop. We should know better who
and what we are.
In closing, I want to say a few words about the late Mary Jo Frug, in
whose honor this Symposium has been held. Frug was one of the first
legal scholars to merge feminism and critical legal studies-a "femcrit," as
she and others identified themselves. In preparing for this Symposium, I
pulled up each of Frug's published articles and read or re-read them.2 13
To modern, sensibilities, this work can seem a bit dated-written in a time
when "trashing" was a norm in scholarly fashion and when feminism was
alive with prospects and possibilities for transforming society and its
modes of discourse. 2 14 What remains striking and most relevant about
Frug's work today, however, is its constantly critical, questioning spirit, and
the -fact that a decade later its questions have not been answered. Frug
insisted on social honesty, devoting much of her effort to revealing the
hidden biases and predilections of our laws. It seems as if we have lost
some of that edge in legal scholarship of late, and I wonder if the legal
academy is not in too many ways a mirror of our times-too complacent,
too enamored of the market and its metrics.
Mary Jo Frug's scholarly corpus was left incomplete when she was
senselessly, brutally murdered by some man who has never been caught.
Her too brief life did not end in fairy tale fashion. But she has left us all
with a valuable gift: a set of questions and a means of asking them, both to
haunt us and to hold out hope of better times-ever after.
213. See, e.g., Mary Jo Frug, Sexual Equality & Sexual Differences in American Law,
26 NEW ENG. L. Rv. 665 (1992) (tracing development of feminist legal doctrine
and indicating that postmodern Feminist Doctrine offers most promise for femi-
nist cause) [hereinafter Frug, Sexual Equality]; Mary Jo Frug, A Postmodern Feminist
Legal Manifesto (An Unfinished Draft), 105 HARv. L. REv. 1045 (1992) [hereinafter
Frug, Manifesto] (discussing role of legal system in creating gender identities);
MaryJo Frug, Rescuing Impossibility Doctrine: A Postmodern Feminist Analysis of Contract
Law, 140 U. PA. L. Rv. 1029 (1992) (applying feminist theories to common law
contract doctrines to highlight how conventional analytical devices are based on
current gender biased system) [hereinafter Frug, Rescuing Impossibility]; Mary Jo
Frug, Law & Postmodernism: The Politics of a Marriage, 62 U. COLO. L. REv. 483
(1991) (offering criticism and identifying contradictions found in article by Profes-
sor Wicke which suggested that postmodernism should not become too influential
in law while simultaneously suggesting that such influence would not be negative)
[hereinafter Frug, Law & Postmodernism].
214. See, e.g., Frug, Manifesto, supra note 213, at 1047 (noting that "flip, conde-
scending and mocking tones" often characterize post modern writing).
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